Past conferences and workshops
Workshop: Dementia in the Courtroom
This is a workshop run in conjunction with the Australian Neurolaw Database Project.
Date: Friday 14 October 2016
Time:14:45 - 17:00
Venue: E3A 244
All are welcome.
Dementia is the single greatest cause of disability in older Australians aged 65 years and over, with a significant associated economic and social burden. Given our aging population there will be an increasing number of people with dementia entering the legal system, creating unique challenges around evidence, capacity, responsibility, just sentencing, and management of offenders.
Dementia may affect capacity to make decisions in various legal domains, including financial management and creation or alteration of a will. Fronto-temporal dementia (behavioural type) causes changes in a person’s behaviour and personality, which can result in criminal behaviour. In this workshop an expert panel will discuss a selection of recent criminal cases from the Australian Neurolaw Database (www.neurolaw.edu.au) where dementia has been a central issue and draw out the legal, ethical and policy issues raised by those cases.
Expert Panellists will include:
- Associate Professor Arlie Loughnan: Criminal Law Theorist
- Dr. Hayley Bennett: Barrister and Neuropsychologist
- Dr. Pauline Langeluddeke: Clinical Psychologist and expert witness
Workshop: Recognizing those without capacity
Date: Thursday 22 September 2016
Time: 09.30 - 16.45
Establishing ethically appropriate ways of engaging with those who lack capacity to consent is challenging in the context of healthcare and medical research. We propose to address these challenges by exploring a new approach using the concept of recognition. Recognition involves a certain kind of acknowledgment and practical engagement with another that affirms them as more than a mere thing, irrespective of their capacity.
In this workshop we will explore what behaviours and dispositions constitute recognition on the part of practitioners/researchers, and what benefits might derive from such behaviours and dispositions. This workshop will consider whether recognition of those who lack capacity is best achieved through proxy/surrogate decision making, assent or a new approach altogether.
To help explore these ideas, some of us will examine the case of nonhuman animals. Whereas problems arise when dealing with humans who lack capacity precisely because the structure of many ethical and legal frameworks assumes a rational, capacitous human as its default subject, there is no such presumption in the case of our dealings with animals. Instead, there is an acknowledgement that by virtue of the nature of their being, animals are unable to consent so that clinicians (veterinarians) need to find alternate ways of recognizing their patients in order to deliver respectful and appropriate care.
Workshop: Social Cognition and Cultural Evolution
Joint CAVE/CCD Workshop: Tuesday 2 August 2016
Date: 2 August 2016
Time: 09:30 - 18:00
Venue: MGSM room 267 (F23 on the campus map)
On the second of August, the Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics and the Centre for Cognition and its Disorders at Macquarie University are holding a one day workshop on Social Cognition and Cultural Evolution with Professor Cecilia Heyes (Oxford) to deliver the keynote address: “The Cultural Evolution of Mindreading". The workshop will include an interdisciplinary line up of speakers from Philosophy and Psychology.
The workshop is free and all are welcome.
Conference: Social Imaginaries: Dominance and Resistance
This is a joint conference with the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney.
Date: Friday 22 July 2016
Time: 09:00 - 17:00
Venue: The Justice and Police Museum, Cnr. Albert and Phillip Streets, Circular Quay
The influence of the imagination, embodiment, and context is now widely recognised in ethical, social and political philosophy. In these fields philosophers have explored how dominant social imaginaries can adversely affect individuals and social groups in interpersonal and institutional settings. This conference will explore the power and influence of the imagination as well as our capacity to transform damaging imaginaries.
- Sally Haslanger (MIT)
- José Medina (Vanderbilt)
Workshop: Legal Processes and Human Rights
Date: Tuesday 26 April 2016
Venue: Blackshield Room, W3A 501
Time: 09:00 - 16:30
The aim is to bring together scholars working in the areas of philosophy, legal philosophy and legal processes to investigate the moral foundations of legal processes and to analyse procedural laws from a human rights and/or justice perspective.
All are welcome. Seats are limited.
Workshop: Social Cognition and the Self
Date: Wednesday 16 March 2016
Venue: Robert Menzies College Seminar Room
Time: 10:00 - 18:00
10:00 - 11:15: Albert Newen (Bochum), "How do we understand other human beings? The person model theory."
11:15 - 11:30: Coffee
11:30 - 12:30: Glenda Satne (UOW), "Interaction and Self-Correction"
12:30 - 13:45: Lunch (not provided)
13:45 - 14:45: Katsunori Miyahara (Rikkyo), "Enactivism and intercorporeity: in what does the primacy of second-person interaction consist?"
14:55 - 15:55: PhD sessions
- 14:55 - 15:25: Hoda Mostafavi (Macquarie), "Origins of understanding others: social niche construction."
- 15:25 - 15:55: Caitrin Donovan (Sydney), "Together in Bedlam: making sense of shared delusions."
15:55 - 16:15: Coffee
16:15 - 17:30: Victoria McGeer (Princeton/ANU), TBC.
18:00: Drinks and dinner (venue TBC)
Keynote address: Albert Newen (Bochum)
Title: "How do we understand other human beings? The person model theory"
Abstract: I argue that we are in need of a new theory of understanding others that accounts for the difference between low-level and high-level mindreading and does not run into the problems neither of TT nor ST. I argue that the person model theory can do the job. I suggest that we develop ‘person models’ of ourselves, of other individuals and of groups of persons. These person models are the basis for the registration and evaluation of persons having mental as well as physical properties. Since there are two ways of understanding other minds (non-conceptual and conceptual mindreading), I propose that there are two kinds of person models: Very early in life we develop implicit person schemata: A person schema is a system of sensory-motor abilities and basic mental dispositions related to one human being (or a group of humans) while the schema functions without awareness and is realized by (relatively) modular information processes. Step by step we also develop explicit person images: A person image is a system of consciously registered mental and physical dispositions as well as situational experiences (like perceptions, emotions, attitudes, etc.) related to one human being (or a group). We have clear evidence of implicit communication in humans which can best be understood as an automatic understanding of other minds by implicitly registering someone’s emotions and attitudes. On the basis of such implicit person schemata, young children learn to develop explicit person images which in the case of groups are stereotypes of managers, students or homeless people. We also develop detailed person images of individuals we often deal with.
All are welcome.
Conference: The Feeling of Suffering
This is a joint workshop with the Value of Suffering Project (Glasgow, founded by the John Templeton Foundation), UNSW, and CAVE.
Date: Thursday - Friday 18 - 19 February 2016
Venue: Australian Hearing Hub Theatre 1
Time: 08:45 - 17:35; 09:30 - 17:35
What is the significance of how suffering feels? Remarkably, it is often neglected that suffering also has a “phenomenology”; that is, it feels a certain way, typically unpleasant. Could physical and emotional suffering have played their crucial roles—could they have had the
same motivational force, for example—without feeling unpleasant? What is the relationship between suffering and pleasure? What ethical weight does the feeling of suffering add over and above merely bad states? Can neuroimaging and other advances in technology overcome the traditional assumption
that suffering is an irreducibly private experience? These questions provide much-needed illumination of the nature, the role, and indeed the very idea of phenomenology, and of the similarities and differences between suffering and pleasure.
This workshop will bring together philosophers, psychologists, bioethicists, and practitioners to explore these issues over two days.
Confirmed speakers include:
- David Bain (Philosophy, University of Glasgow), “Why take painkillers?”
- Brock Bastian (Psychology, University of New South Wales), “From pleasure to pain and beyond”
- Michael Brady (Philosophy, University of Glasgow), “The feeling of suffering and the virtues of strength and wisdom”
- Jennifer Corns (Philosophy, University of Glasgow), “Hedonic independence and the negativity bias”
- Laura Ferris (Psychology, University of Queensland), “Feeling hurt: revisiting the relationship between social and physical pain”
- Cindy Harmon-Jones (Psychology, University of New South Wales), “Suffering and meaning: pain, dissonance, and meaning-making”
- Julia Hush (Physiotherapy, Macquarie University), “The experience of pain and suffering: the brain and beyond”
- Jolanda Jetten (Psychology, University of Queensland), “‘The more the merrier’: multiple group membership as a resource to alleviate suffering”
- Colin Klein (Philosophy, Macquarie University), “Suffering and the varieties of bodily care”
- Lorimer Moseley (Neuroscience & Physiotherapy, University of South Australia), “Pain, chronic pain, damage, and the Amazing Protectometer”
- Wendy Rogers (Clinical Ethics, Macquarie University), “Screening, suffering and overdiagnosis or ‘A stitch in time… causes suffering’”
- Luke Russell (Philosophy, University of Sydney), “Forgiving those who have suffered enough”
Profiles of the conference speakers can be found on our visitors page.
Workshop: The Virtues and Limits of Coherence in Moral and Legal Reasoning
Date: 16 February 2016
Venue: Blackshield Room (W3A 501)
Time: 09:00 - 17:00
Coherent theories of moral and legal reasoning have become significant in the last decades. These theories argue that decision-makers should develop a scheme in which all reasons support each other and form a coherent whole. Hence, the more reasons support a particular decision, the more likely it is correct. However, coherent theories can be challenging as these require agents to consider all possible norms and arguments before reaching a decision. Also, a set of reasons may be entirely coherent but ethically unjustifiable. In this way, the workshop aims to open a space for critical analysis of the virtues and limits of coherence in moral and legal reasoning.
Keynote Speaker: Amalia Amaya (UNAM)
Amalia is a Research Fellow at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Her latest book The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument (Hart Publishing, 2015) articulates an interdisciplinary coherence-based theory of legal reasoning.
Conference: Perspectives on Empathy
Date: Wednesday - Thursday 4 - 5 November 2015
Venue: Robert Menzies College, Seminar Room 2, Herring Rd
Time: 09:30 - 17:00
Empathy is a widely used concept in both social and moral domains of enquire. Empathy deficits are supposed to explain both moral and social impairments. It seems self-evident that empathy is a good thing: indeed, many writers think that empathy is integral to morality. But what is empathy? The term is used to cover a wide array of cognitive and affective processes. Which of these processes is fundamental to morality and how? Should we be skeptical about the claims made for empathy?
The Macquarie Research Centre for Agency Values and Ethics (CAVE) and the Agency and Moral Cognition Network present the Perspectives on Empathy Conference to be held at Macquarie University on November 4th and 5th 2015. Empathy is of interest to researchers across a range of disciplines including in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, psychiatry and psychology, moral psychology, ethics and aesthetics. Yet there is no clear agreement on what empathy is and the role it plays in moral development, social and moral cognition, imagination, and motivation. This conference seeks to bring researchers from across disciplines together to consider a range of questions about the nature, function and importance of empathy.
- Heidi Maibom (Cincinatti), "Imagining Feelings"
The event is free, and all are welcome, but please register for catering purposes.
Conference: Defining the Boundaries of Disease
Date: Thursday - Friday 15 - 16 October 2015
Venue: Dunmore Lang College, Macquarie University
Time: 09:00 - 17:00
A two-day multi-disciplinary conference will be held at Macquarie University, Sydney, on October 15-16, 2015. This conference brings together scholars in the philosophy of medicine together with practicing clinicians in discussing just where, and why, the boundaries of disease should be set.
Questions relating to what should and should not be counted as disease, and where exactly the boundary between disease and non-disease should lie, are critical to the provision of appropriate health care. However, these questions have become increasingly complex with changes in medical knowledge and diagnostic technologies. The distinction between risk factor and disease has become blurred; common diseases have been redefined expansively (e.g. type 2 diabetes or chronic kidney disease); and sophisticated diagnostic tests now detect abnormalities which may or may not have pathological implications.
Responding to these questions requires engaging with medical and scientific knowledge and with the philosophical literature on disease definition. But these are not merely interesting academic questions: there are serious practical implications to setting disease boundaries. Where is the 'right' place for these boundaries, such that patients receive appropriate treatments to avoid excess morbidity and mortality, while avoiding the harms of overdiagnosis and overtreatment?
Workshop: Consciousness, Subjectivity, and Self
Conference: Australasian Association of Philosophy 2015
Date: Sunday - Thursday 5 - 9 July 2015
The AAP Conference is held annually by the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP). This conference is designed to give professional philosophers and philosophy postgraduate students the opportunity to present and discuss papers in all areas of philosophy.
The 2015 AAP Conference will be hosted by the Philosophy Department at Macquarie University, in Sydney from Sunday 5th July to Thursday 9th July 2015.
For more information, please see the AAP conference website.
CAVE members, affiliates, students, and visitors are all presenting at the AAP, so look out for these talks!
- Cordelia Fine (CAVE affiliate, Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, Melbourne Business School): The gender galaxy beyond Mars and Venus: Insights for science and society.
Abstract: AAP website.
- Cheshire Calhoun (CAVE Distinguished Visitor 2013, Arizona State University): Well Content
- Cordelia Fine (CAVE affiliate, Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, Melbourne Business School): Bringing down the T-Rex, Gender and Testosterone
- Dan Zahavi (CAVE Distinguished Visitor 2015, Copenhagen): Empathy, affective sharing, and second-person perspective taking
More info on the keynote speakers: AAP Conference Page.
Workshop: Amnesia and Identity: self, memory, and moral psychology
Date: 15 June 2015
Venue: Australian Hearing Hub, Room 1.200
Time: 09:30 - 17:15
This exciting workshop has been sponsored and organised by the Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE), the Department of Cognitive Science, the ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD): Belief Formation and Memory Programs, and the Collective Cognition Team.
This interdisciplinary workshop will welcome Professor Carl Craver, an internationally renowned philosopher from Washington University in St Louis, to Macquarie University. The workshop will feature a Keynote Talk by Professor Carver as well as presentations from researchers across a range of disciplines including philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience, exploring memory, amnesia and identity.
Keynote by Carl Craver: Identity and Continuity in Amnesia
Abstract: No cognitive faculty is more closely associated with personal identity and continuity over time than episodic memory. I use philosophical arguments and neuropsychological evidence to weaken this association. Among the novel empirical findings I report are preserved capacity for narration in a scaffolded story-telling test in individuals with dense amnesias and preserved sense of personal continuity in a case of an extreme working memory deficit. Throughout, I will argue that much of our forensic sense of personal continuity over time can be retained even in the face of dramatic episodic memory deficits.
- Professor Carl Craver, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis
- Professor Amanda Barnier, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Macquarie University
- Dr Rochelle Cox, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Macquarie University
- Dr Muireann Irish, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Neuroscience Research Australia
- Associate Professor Dominic Murphy, Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney
- Dr Penny van Bergen, School of Education, Macquarie University
- Anke Snoek, Research Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics
09:30 - 10:00 : Tea/Cofee and Welcome
10:00 - 11:15 : Carl Craver (Washington University in St Louis), "Identity and Continuity in Amnesia"
11:15 - 12:00 : Muireann Irish (CCD, Neuroscience Research Australia)
12:00 - 13:00 : Lunch
13:00 - 13:35 : Penny Van Bergen (Macquarie University)
13:35 - 14:10 : Anke Snoek (CAVE, Macquarie University)
13:10 - 14:45 : Amanda Barnier (CCD, Macquarie University)
14:45 - 15:15 : Coffee
15:15 - 15:50 : Rochelle Cox (CCD, Macquarie University)
15:50 - 16:35 : Dominic Murphy (University of Sydney)
16:35 - 17:15 : Discussion
Workshop: Predictive Coding, Delusions, and Agency
Date: Friday 15 May
Venue: Room 3.610 Australian Hearing Hub
Time: 13:30 - 17:00
Predictive coding is a new and powerful model of brain architecture, which has attracted a significant amount of scientific and philosophical attention. This workshop will explore applications of the framework to theories of belief formation and agency in both ordinary and delusional agents. Speakers will include Jakob Hohwy (Monash), Philip Gerrans (Adelaide) and Elizabeth Schier (Macquarie).
All are welcome.
Workshop: Understanding Complex Animal Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Workshop
Date: Monday - Tuesday 2 - 3 February 2015
Venue: Australian Hearing Hub Theatre 1
Time: 09:00 - 18:00; 09:30 - 13:30
Philosophers and scientists alike have long been interested in the methodological challenges to our understanding of the presence and nature of so-called "complex" cognitive traits in non-human animals. Understanding such cognition in non-human animals is central to understanding the evolutionary origins of various traits in our own species including consciousness, self, agency and language. To-date, the vast majority of the philosophical work in this area has been focused on the methodologies used to test for abstract reasoning, mental time-travel, mindreading and language in chimpanzees and other primates. Over the past fifteen years, however, various behaviours indicative of complex cognition (particularly, tool manufacture and use, and causal problem solving) have been demonstrated in lineages beyond our own, most particularly in birds. New Caledonian Crows, for example, manufacture and builds tools in the wild, and have also been shown to be impressive causal problem solvers in the lab. These new findings from the sciences have underscored the role that phylogenetic proximity plays in our assumptions and reasoning about primate cognition, and highlighted the depth of the methodological challenges facing our study of the non-human animal mind beyond our closest relatives. While discussion of the challenges to our understanding the non-human animal mind abound, suggestions of how to overcome them (particularly for non-primate species) are few and far between. Furthermore, recent work on the constitutive and causal role of the environment and culture in cognition presents a new way of thinking about evidence from non-human animal experiments that has been little explored.
This workshop will bring together some of the leading scientists and philosophers working in comparative psychology in an attempt to make some headway on the many methodological issues in the study of "complex" animal cognition.
Program: Animal Cognition Blog [link]
Abstracts: Animal Cognition Blog [link]
Workshop: The Problem with Choosing Children's Gender
Date: Thursday 18 December 2014
Venue: Zofrea Room, The Hub (C10A, level 3)
Time: 09:20 - 16:30
The workshop will launch and discuss the first empirical study of parents who have selected, or desire to select, their child's gender. The main objective of the workshop is to facilitate discussion around the topical subject of using assisted reproductive technologies for gender selection for non-medical reasons in Australia. Currently, the NHMRC ART Guidelines regulating gender selection are under revision. While bioethicists raise concerns about the negative implications of preconception gender selection for social reasons, there is demand among Australian reproducers and ART clinics to legalise the practice. Informed by the empirical evidence, the workshop will discuss arguments in favour of and against gender selection and host a panel on policy in Australia.
This workshop aims to investigate some of these important questions:
- Is gender selection for non-medical reasons a harmful practice?
- Should gender selection for non-medical reasons become legal in Australia?
- What are the best policy approaches to gender selection?
Speakers for the workshop will include:
- Professor Colin Thomson (University of Wollongong)
- Dr. Sonia Allan (Macquarie University)
- Dr. Jennifer Germon (University of Sydney)
- Tereza Hendl (PhD student, Macquarie University)
- a member of the AHEC Committee
- a fertility specialist
Workshop: Synthetic Biology
Date: Wednesday 10 December 2014
Venue: Trinity Chapel, Robert Menzies College, North Ryde
Time: 9:30 - 17:00
This December, join distinguished speakers from world-leading universities in a workshop exploring synthetic biology research. Hosted by Macquarie University's Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics this workshop will provide an invigorating platform to discuss ethics, governance and potential future applications of synthetic biology.
Featuring speakers from:
- Macquarie University
- University of Edinburgh
- Johns Hopkins University
- The University of Sydney
- The University of Tasmania
Workshop: Moral Responsibility - Non-metaphysical Approaches
Date: Thursday - Friday 20-21 November 2014
Time: 09:15 - 16:45
A workshop on the topic of "Moral Responsibility: Non-Metaphysical Perspectives" will be held at Macquarie University on 20-21 November 2014. Visiting speakers for the workshop will include:
- Professor Marina Oshana (UC Davis)
- Professor Natalie Stoljar (McGill)
- Dr Jules Holroyd (Nottingham)
- Dr Daniel Cohen (CAPPE)
Many philosophers now deny the relevance of the metaphysics of the free will debate to moral responsibility. They offer non-metaphysical grounds for moral responsibility, for example as a feature of human psychology, or as an ineliminable aspect of interpersonal relationships.
Such approaches often draw inspiration from either P.F. Strawson's influential notion of morally reactive attitudes, Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical conception of personhood, and/or Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities.
These non-metaphysical approaches tend to describe moral responsibility in terms of related capacities such as reasons-responsiveness (Fischer) or the capacity for reflective self-control (Wallace), and in close association with related concepts such as autonomy.
Despite the increasing prevalence of non-metaphysical approaches, they raise many important questions that are yet to be adequately explored. For example, although these approaches often presuppose a close connection between autonomy and moral responsibility, the nature of this relationship has received little attention. It is also surprising that the moral responsibility literature includes so little feminist work, particularly given the influence of feminist approaches to autonomy (such as relational autonomy).
This workshop aims to investigate some of these important, under-explored questions. Likely topics include, but are not limited to:
- Exploration of the relationship between moral responsibility and autonomy
- Feminist approaches to moral responsibility
- Responsibility for character: are we responsible for our characters, and what does this mean?
- Moral responsibility and implicit bias - are we responsible for our implicit biases?
- Non-metaphysical approaches to blame and punishment
Thursday 20th November 2014
09:15 : Registration, Tea and Coffee
09:30 : Welcome
09:40 : Natalie Stoljar, "Answerability: a condition of autonomy, or moral responsibility, or both?"
10:55 : Morning Tea
11:25 : Katrina Hutchison, "Moral Responsibility, Control and Oppression"
12:40 : Lunch
13:45 : Marina Oshana, "What might a feminist theory of moral responsibility look like?"
15:00 : Afternoon Tea
15:30 : Jeanette Kennett, "Reactive Attitudes, Reasons and Responsibility"
16:45 : Finish
19:00 : Workshop Dinner (Blu Ginger, McMahon's Point)
Friday 21st November 2014
09:15 : Tea and Coffee
09:30 : Jules Holroyd, "Revisionism and Responsibility"
10:45 : Morning tea
11:15 : Daniel Cohen, "The meaning of 'responsibility'"
12:30 : Lunch
13:30 :Nicole Vincent, "Why mental capacity?"
14:45 : Response session led by Catriona Mackenzie
15:45 : Afternoon Tea + Finish
Workshop: Addressing challenges in consent to surgical innovations
Date: Friday 31 October 2014
Venue: C10A, McKenzie Room
Time: 09:30 - 13:00
The aim of the workshop is to identify ethical, practical and legal challenges that arise in seeking patient consent to innovative surgical procedures, in order to develop ways of addressing these challenges.
- Dr Katrina Hutchison (Post-doctoral researcher, Macquarie University): "Health professionals' views on consent to innovative surgery"
- Professor Henry Pleass (Professor of Surgery, University of Sydney, Westmead Clinical School): "Practical issues in obtaining consent for innovative surgery"
- Dr Kim Hill (Executive Medical Director, West Sydney Local Health District): Response to Prof Pleass
- A/Prof Bernadette Richards (University of Adelaide Law School): "A legal viewpoint on consent to innovative surgery"
This workshop is part of the activities of ARC LP110200217 "On the cutting edge: Promoting best practice in surgical innovation"
Workshop: Cultural Evolution
Date: Tuesday 19 August 2014
Venue: MGSM Theatre 101
Time: 09:15 - 18:30
Announcing a one-day workshop with Kevin Laland (St. Andrews) on social learning and cultural evolution. The workshop will include speakers from the Biology and Philosophy departments at Macquarie University.
Traditionally, culture has been seen as a uniquely human trait. Recent evidence of social learning capable of sustaining multi-generational behavioural inheritance in animal species from fish to primates challenges this picture. Rather than being a lonely biological peculiarity, it is now clear that human cultural inheritance sits at one end of a spectrum of types of cultural and traditional inheritance mechanisms seen right across the Animal Kingdom. When viewed in this light, the study of animal social learning, traditions and cultures, is essential to understanding human cultural evolution, and vice versa. In this interdisciplinary workshop, philosophers and biologists working on cultural evolution and social learning in animals and humans come together to consider key issues such as the role of niche construction in cultural evolution, the importance of development to a science of human and animal cultural evolution, the tempo and mode of cultural evolution and the similarities and differences in cultural inheritance mechanisms between species.
09:15 - 09:55: Coffee/tea and registration
09:55 - 10:00: Introduction
10:00 - 11:30: Kevin Laland (St. Andrews), "The Evolution of Culture"
11:30 - 12:00: Morning coffee/tea
12:00 - 13:00: Culum Brown (Macquarie), "Social Learning in Fishes"
13:00 - 14:00: Lunch
14:00 - 15:00: Rachael Brown (Macquarie), "Impossible Cultures? Exploring the Applicability of the Evo-Devo Conceptual Framework in the Cultural Domain"
15:00 - 16:00: Karola Stotz (Macquarie), "Two kinds of niche construction"
16:00 - 16:30: Coffee/tea
16:30 - 17:30: Richard Menary (Macquarie), "The Enculturated Brain: The Case of Mathematics"
17:30 - 18:30: Andrew Barron (Macquarie), TBC
The workshop is free to attend, but registration is essential.
Workshop: Ethics in the Field
Date: Friday 1 August 2014
Time: 09:20 - 17:00
The idea of 'field philosophy' has emerged as a response to calls for academic philosophy to become more relevant to so-called 'real-world' problems. Field philosophy aims to "begin with problems faced by nonphilosophic actors in real-world settings and seek to make contributions deemed successful according to more-than-disciplinary standards" (Robert Frodeman, Adam Briggle, and J. Britt Holbrook, 2012, "Philosophy in the Age of Neoliberalism," Social Epistemology, 26:3-4, 3-11-330, p.324).
Participants in the workshop, "Ethics in the Field," will include Professor Robert Frodeman (a pioneer in field philosophy), Professor Rachel Ankeny of the University of Adelaide, as well as other scholars working (frequently unconsciously) in field philosophy, e.g., bioethics (animal, medical, clinical, and surgical ethics), research ethics and environmental humanities. Topics discussed will revolve around how to do field philosophy successfully, e.g., how to identify relevant problems, engage across disciplines, attract funding, communicate results to a variety of audiences, and impact public policy.
09:20 - 09:25: Jane Johnson, Introduction and welcome.
09:25 - 09:30: Catriona Mackenzie, Opening.
09:30 - 10:30: Robert Frodeman, "Socrates Tenured: Inventing new institutions for 21st century philosophy."
10:30 - 11:00: Morning tea
11:00 - 11:45: Rachel Ankeny, "Doing 'Field Work' with Food: How can philosophy contribute to food ethics and policy?"
11:45 - 12:30: Anna Smajdor, "Notes from an unconscious field-ethicist."
12:30 - 13:30: Lunch
13:30 - 14:15: Katrina Hutchison and Wendy Rogers, "An ARC Linkage on surgical innovation - Field Philosophy at work?"
14:15 - 15:00: Chris Degeling, Anne Fawcett, and Margaret Rose, "Philosophical field work and animals."
15:00 - 15:30: Afternoon tea
15:30 - 17:00: Robert Frodeman, Rachel Ankeny, Cassily Charles, David Hunter, and Mary Walker, Panel discussion - "The way forward for field ethics?"
Meeting: Agency and Moral Cognition Network
Date: Thursday-Friday 29-30 May 2014
Venue: Thursday Room 3.610, Australian Hearing Hub; Friday W6A 708
Time: Thursday 14:00 - 17:00; Friday 10:00 - 17:00
The keynote address will be given by Prof. Fiery Cushman (Brown University), and will be entitled, "Why Learning Matters for Morality."
Abstract: Humans use punishment and reward to modify each others' behavior, and we also learn from others' rewards and punishments. This simple dynamic animates much of our moral psychology, and I explore two of its consequences in detail. First, human punishment should be adapted to the contours and constraints of human learning. This can explain a peculiar feature of our moral judgments that philosophers calls "moral luck": the fact that accidental outcomes play a large roll in determining punishment. Second, the architecture of human learning should dictate when and how we choose to harm others. I borrow from current neurobiological models of reinforcement learning to understand why we deem some harmful actions impermissible and others permissible. These case studies illustrate the role that learning systems play as a basic organizing principle in the moral domain.
Thursday May 29 - Room 3.610 Hearing Hub
14:00 - 14:10 : Welcome
14.10 - 15.10 : Neil Levy (Melbourne/Oxford), "Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck"
15.10 - 15.30 : Coffee
15.30 - 16.30 : Toby Handfield (Monash), "Cognitive heuristics in punishment related behaviour"
16.35 - 17.35 : Jess Kingswood and Marc de Rosnay (Sydney), "Identity coherence: the source of moral motivation"
19:00 : Dinner
Friday May 30 - Room 708 Building W6A
10.30 - 12:00 : Fiery Cushman (Brown), "Why Learning Matters for Morality."
12:00 - 13:30 : Lunch
13:30 - 14:30 : Mark de Rosnay and Ming Yuan (Sydney), "You are who you when no one is watching: Australian and Chinese children's use of contextual and motive information when making moral trait inferences"
14.35 - 15.35 : Daniel Cohen (CSU), "Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Using IAT to evaluate Strawson's claim that judgements of responsibility require emotional engagement with wrongdoers (i.e. via the 'participant stance')"
Co-authors: Jeremy Goldring (CSU), Lauren Saling (CSU), Neil Levy (Melbourne/Oxford)
15.35 - 15.55 : Coffee
16:00 - 17.00 : Graham Wood (UTas), "From action-based value representations to belief in objective value"
For abstracts, please see the full program PDF, 435.09 KB
Workshop: Neurolaw in Australia
Date: Friday 2 May 2014
Venue: W6A 708
Time: 13:45 - 17:00
This interdisciplinary workshop will examine the influence of neuro evidence in criminal trials in Australia. Speakers will include academics, a psychiatrist, a barrister, and a forensic psychologist working in criminal law.
13:45 - Welcome and Coffee
14:00 - Nicole Vincent (Georgia State University, and CAVE Research Associate) will introduce The Australian Neurolaw Database Project and address the question of what neurolaw is and what issues are raised for the law by developments in the mind sciences.
14:25 - Allan McCay (University of Sydney) will give an overview of the development of neuro case law in Australia, and introduce three cases for discussion by our panel of experts. The panel will discuss each case in turn and take questions.
Panel discussion of neurolaw cases:
- Dr. Christopher Ryan (Consultant Psychiatrist Westmead Hospital and Clinical Senior Lecturer in Psychiatry, University of Sydney);
- Dr. Christopher Birch SC (Barrister and Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School);
- Amanda White (Forensic Psychologist, Macquarie University).
16:35 - Summing up: Nicole Vincent
Workshop: Evolution of Language
Workshop in conjunction with CCD
Date: Friday 6 December 2013
Venue: Australian Hearing Hub, Lecture Theatre 1.200
Time: 9:30am - 5:00pm
In 1866, the Linguistic Society of Paris banned debate on the subject of language evolution, perhaps due to the appearance of speculative theories on the origins of spoken language. Several of these were recounted by the historian Max Müller (1861):
The Bow-wow (aka Cuckoo) theory proposed that early words were imitations of the cries of beasts and birds, whereas the Poop-pooh theory maintained that first words were emotional interjects triggered by pleasure or pain, and the Yo-he-ho theory suggested that language developed to synchronize muscular effort by alternating sounds such as heave with sounds such as ho.
Despite the initial attractiveness of such theories, they have been largely discredited, and replaced by two alternative approaches to the origins of language. One is the Continuity (gradualist) approach. On this view, the emergence of language in the species can be explained by invoking the same kind of adaptive (descent with modification) mechanisms that have shaped other traits. Language is a rich computational system that coordinates the rapid and effortless alignment of a speaker's world knowledge with that of a hearer's, using the linguistic subsystems of phonology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The interleaving of these components in acts of communication is so complex that advocates of the continuity approach find it difficult to imagine how language could simply appear from nothing in its final form.
The alternative Discontinuity (saltationist) approach has reached the opposite conclusion. On this view, the fact that modern humans have language, whereas our remote ancestors did not, was due to a single, chance genetic micromutation. The discontinuity approach contends that language must have appeared in its "near perfect" form because language is a uniquely human cognitive trait that invokes recursive data structures (discrete infinity) and, logically, there is no way for there to be a gradual transition from a mind/brain that is only capable of computing finite operations, to one that is capable of generating an unbounded number of novel linguistic expressions.
This workshop is devoted to an in-depth discussion of the origins of language. Among the questions that will be discussed are the following:
- What is language?
- What aspects of language are unique to humans?
- What can language acquisition tell us about language evolution?
- How is language represented in the brain?
- What function, if any, does language serve?
- Were there proto-languages?
- Did language evolve gradually or was its evolution a 'sudden emergent event'?
- Is there a gestural origin to language?
- What is the relationship between logic and language?
- Professor Bob Berwick, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Professor Kim Sterelny, Australian National University
- Emeritus Professor Brian Byrne, University of New England
- Associate Professor Drew Khlentzos, University of New England
- Dr Richard Menary, Macquarie University
See also the CCD page: CCD.
Date: Thursday-Friday 21-22 November 2013
Time: 8:45am - 6:00pm; 9:00am - 5:40pm.
Appeals to the innate dignity of humanity and claims about the need to treat people with dignity and respect are commonplace in a range of philosophical and public debates on everything from bioethics to the foundation of universal human rights. But although foundational appeals to human dignity are commonplace, what dignity is, and what it means to have it, remains less than clear. This raises important philosophical questions, such as: Why do human beings have dignity? Is dignity something that all humans have? Can animals have dignity? Is dignity something that can be gained and lost? Does dignity come in degrees? Most philosophical approaches to dignity are grounded in the work of Immanuel Kant. But Kant's conception of dignity is contested by scholars. So what exactly is Kant's conception of dignity? And how does Kant's conception of dignity differ from alternative conceptions of dignity, such as Martha Nussbaum's Aristotelian-inspired view? This leads to further questions, such as: Does the basis of dignity lie in our autonomy or our needs (or both)? Finally, how does the concept of dignity get used in moral, political and legal debates, such as in bioethics?
Speakers (in alphabetical order): Marcus Duwell (University of Utrecht), Paul Formosa (Macquarie University), Samuel J Kerstein (University of Maryland), David Kirchhoffer (Australian Catholic University), Catriona Mackenzie (Macquarie University), Thaddeus Metz (University of Johannesburg), Sarah Clark Miller (Penn State University), Doris Schroder (University of Central Lancashire), Oliver Sensen (Tulane University) and Adrian Walsh (University of New England).
Workshop: Judging Responsibility
Date: Wednesday 20 November 2013
Venue: Y3A 212
Time: 1:00pm - 5:30pm
Adrian Carter (Queensland), Allan McCay (Sydney), Kate Rossmanith (Macquarie), and Nicole Vincent (Georgia State) dealt with the legal issues surrounding the problem or responsibility.
13.00 - 14.00 : Nicole A. VIncent (Georgia State University), "Doing Away With Capacities: a non-capacitarian compatibilist approach to responsibility."
14.05 - 15.00 : Adrian Carter (NHMRC Research Fellow, University of Queensland Centre for Clinical Research), "Irresistible impulses? A legal case of drug-induced compulsive sexual behaviours."
15.30 - 16.25 : Allan McCay (University of Sydney), "The sentencing of Aboriginal offenders and genetic vulnerabilities to the crimogenic effects of social environments."
16.30 - 17.25 : Kate Rossmanith (Macquarie University), "The Feelings of Judges (or 'How Judges Judge Feelings'): The role of sworn evidence and affect in assessing offender remorse."
Workshop: Relational Autonomy and Bioethics
Date: Wednesday 6 November 2013
Venue: W6A 107
Time: 1:30pm - 14:30pm
1:30 - 1:40 : Brief introduction (Katrina Hutchison)
1:40 - 2:20 : Discussion of Catriona Mackenzie's "Autonomy", forthcoming in Routledge Companion to Bioethics (led by Catriona Mackenzie)
2:20 - 3:00 : Discussion of Françoise Baylis, Nuala P. Kenny and Susan Sherwin's (2008), "A relational account of public health ethics", Public Health Ethics (led by Wendy Rogers)
3:00 - 3:20 : Afternoon Tea
3:20 - 4:00 : Discussion of Elizabeth Ben-Ishai's (2012), "Responding to vulnerability: the case of injection drug users", International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (led by Elizabeth Ben-Ishai)
4:00 - 4:30 : Round table discussion
Workshop: Ethical Issues in Surgical Innovation
Date: Monday 28 October 2013
Time: 9:30am - 1:00pm
Venue: Interaction Zone, ASAM
Lead respondents will include Dr. Marie Bismarck (University of Melbourne) and Dr. Drew Carter (University of Adelaide)
The aim of the workshop is to present work in progress on specific ethical issues raised by innovative surgery. The presentations will be short, rather than formal papers. Our invited respondents (Prof Miles Little, Prof Vikki Entwistle, Dr Marie Bismark, Dr Drew Carter) will act as a panel or round table to lead discussion on the presentations.
Workshop: Meaning in Life (and why it matters)
Date: Friday 18 October 2013
Venue: MGSM Amphitheatre 102
Speakers include: Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University); Jeanette Kennett (Macquarie); Glen Pettigrove (University of Auckland); Trevor Pisciotta (University of Melbourne); Nicholas Smith (Macquarie)
Meeting: Agency and Moral Cognition Network
Date: Wednesday-Thursday 25-26 September 2013
Venue: Florey Neurosciences Institute, University of Melbourne
Speakers will include Robyn Langdon, Philip Gerrans, Marc de Rosnay, Doris McIlwain, Jonathan McGuire, Ben Fraser, Damian Crone and Luke Russell.
Date: Wednesday 21 August 2013
Venue: W6A 708
Time: 2:00pm - 4:30pm
Main speaker: Michael Quante (University of Münster). Catriona Mackenzie (Macquarie) replied.
Title of Professor Quante's paper: "Autonomous By Default: Assessing 'Non-Alienation' in John Christman's Conception of Personal Autonomy"
Workshop: Vulnerable Animals
Date: 4-5 July 2013
Venue: W6A 708
Workshop: CAVE Bioethics Cluster Work-in-Progress Afternoon
Date: Wednesday 26 June 2013
Venue: W6A 708
Time: 2:00 - 5:00 pm
- Prof Wendy Rogers(CAVE academic staff): Developing and managing an ARC Linkage
- Dr Mary Walker (CAVE post-doc researcher): Access to unapproved and experimental therapeutic goods: Who benefits?
- Lanei Alexander (CAVE HDR student): The ethics of bariatric surgery
- Tereza Hendlova (CAVE HDR student): Sex selection for non-medical reasons
Workshop flyer DOC, 79.27 KB (with further details)
Workshop: Point of View in Memory and Imagery: philosophical and psychological perspectives on perspective
Date: Thursday-Saturday 9-11 May 2013
Times and venues:
Thursday 9 May - 5.30 pm - Australian Hearing Hub Lecture Theatre
Friday 10 May - 10 am - MGSM room 103
Saturday 11 May - 9.30 am - MGSM room 103
This workshop addressed perspective-taking in remembering and imagining, inviting papers from philosophers and psychologists, and from related disciplines. We were particularly interested in proposals which discussed relations between visual or visuospatial perspective and other kinds of perspective, or which address interactions between internal and external perspectives on one's past, future, or possible actions and experiences.
When I remember my past experiences, I may see the remembered scene from my original point of view. Alternatively I may see myself in that remembered scene, as from an observer's perspective. Likewise, when I visualize and imagine my future or possible actions, I may adopt either an internal or 'own eyes' perspective, or an external or 'see-oneself' perspective on those imagined events. Sometimes, in both memory and imagery, I can switch perspectives. The availability of such 'field' and 'observer' perspectives is a puzzling aspect of the phenomenology of memory and imagery. It is the subject of concerted but as yet unintegrated research programs in psychology and philosophy (Nigro & Neisser 1983; Debus 2007; Rice & Rubin 2009; Libby & Eibach 2011; Goldie 2012). The study of vantage-points in memory and imagery raises a range of intriguing questions about self-representation and the body, personality and identity, emotion and mood, movement and space, narrative and time.
Keynote speaker: Lisa Libby (Psychology, Ohio State University)
- Catriona Mackenzie (Philosophy, Macquarie University)
- Tony Morris (Sport Science, Victoria University Melbourne)
- Michelle Moulds (Psychology, University of New South Wales)
- John Sutton (Cognitive Science, Macquarie University)
- Celia Harris (Cognitive Science, MQ)
- Ly Huynh (Psychology, UNSW)
- Nora Mooren (Psychology, UNSW)
- Talia Morag (Philosophy, Sydney)
- Patrick Stokes (Philosophy, Deakin)
- Daniela Helbig (HPS, Sydney)
- Kellie Williamson (Cognitive Science, MQ)
- Tori McGeer (Philosophy, ANU/ Princeton)
- Chris McCarroll (Cognitive Science, MQ)
- Wendy Carlton (Philosophy, MQ)
- Margherita Arcangeli (Institut Nicod)
- Alma Barner (Philosophy, ANU)
- Regina Fabry (Philosophy, Mainz & Cognitive Science, MQ)
- Dorothea Debus (Philosophy, York)
Workshop: Competence in Psychiatric Settings
Date: Thursday 11 April 2013
Venue: W6A 707
Time: 2.30pm - 5.30pm
Dr Jillian Craigie (University College London), Caitrin Donovan (University of Sydney) and Dr Christopher Ryan (University of Sydney)
See FLYER DOC, 76.98 KB for presentation topics and further details.
Workshop: Working in Australia: Contemporary Trends, New Critical Perspectives
Date: 19-20 February 2013
Venue: W6A 127
Time: See program
Guest speakers: Lyndall Strazdins (ANU), Allison Milner (Melbourne) and Geoff Boucher (Deakin)
Workshop: Skills and Expertise
Date: 10-11 December 2012
Venue: Caltex room, MGSM
Time: 9:00am - 6:00pm
How do experts develop and maintain their skills? This workshop brought together researchers from philosophy, psychology and education to consider how experts develop and maintain their high level skills, techniques and knowledge in a variety of domains: including places of work, sports and clinical settings.
Workshop: Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Date: 5 December 2012
Venue: Boyd Room, level 3, Central Hub
Time: 9:00am - 6:00pm
International speakers at this workshop were Dan Hutto (University of Hertfordshire), who spoke on 'Exorcising Action Oriented Representations: Ridding Cognitive Science of its Nazgul', Somogy Varga (University of Memphis), who spoke on 'Philosophy of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy', and Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis), who spoke on on 'Mood Facilitation, Time and Depression'.
Workshop: Capabilities Approaches to Justice: Theory and Practice
Date: Thursday 15 November 2012
Venue: MGSM Amphitheatre 147
Capabilities theory, originally developed by Amartya Sen, has been extremely influential in development contexts as a metric of social equality and inequality. More recently, Martha Nussbaum has extended the theory, developing a capability-based political philosophy of justice, with universalist aspirations. However, despite its influence and appeal, significant questions remain concerning some of the foundational concepts of capabilities theory, such as Nussbaum's use of the concept of human dignity, and the ability of capabilities theory to guide concrete social policy decision-making. The aims of this workshop were to critically appraise the theoretical foundations of capabilities theory and to investigate the theory's application to a range of important practical issues, including disability, healthcare, climate justice, free speech, and the weighting of distinct capabilities. This one day interdisciplinary workshop incuded presenters from Macquarie University, Monash University, University of Dundee, University of Queensland, University of Melbourne, and University of Sydney.
Conference: Australian Society for Legal Philosophy Conference
The 2012 ASLP conference was co-hosted by CAVE and NEUROLAW.au.
Date: 22 July 2012
Venue: Dunmore Lang College
The conference provided a forum to discuss current work in all fields of legal philosophy, but this year's special theme was the topic of
neurolaw, conceived broadly to include law and neuroscience, law and psychology, law and behavioural genetics and related sub-fields.
Keynote speakers included:
Professor Antony Duff (University of Stirling and University of Minnesota)
Professor Joel Eigen (Franklin & Marshall College)
Associate Professor Nita Farahany (Vanderbilt Law School)
Workshop: Addiction Neuroscience: Interpretation and Implications for Public Policy, Legal Practice, Ethics, Treatment, and User Identity and Belief in Self-efficacy
Date: 23 July 2012
Venue: MGSM Room 101
Time: 10:00am - 4:00pm
A central focus of the workshop was Adrian Carter and Wayne Hall's new book Addiction Neuroethics: The Promises and Perils of Neuroscience Research on Addiction (Cambridge University Press 2012). The book examines the social, ethical and public policy issues raised by neuroscience research and its potential applications in the treatment and prevention of addiction and the formulation of social policies towards drug use.
Commentators on the book were Nita Farahany (Professor of Law and Philosophy, Vanderbilt Law School), Antony Duff (Professor of Criminal Law, University of Stirling and University of Minnesota), and Neil Levy (Deputy Director, Oxford Centre for Neuroethics; Head of Neuroethics, Florey Neuroscience Institutes, University of Melbourne).
After lunch, a panel of experts from a range of fields (policy, treatment, users associations) discussed perspectives on the issues as raised from their own practice and experience. Panel members included David McGrath (NSW Health Mental Health and Drug & Alcohol Office), Nicky Bath (NUAA), Bernard Balleine (neuroscientist at Sydney University), Andrew Baillie (psychologist at Macquarie University) and Jon Currie (ANCD/SVHM).
Workshop: Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality - An Interdisciplinary Workshop
The workshop was hosted jointly by:
The Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics (CAVE), Macquarie University,
The Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, and
The School of Humanities, University of New South Wales.
Date: 3-4 May 2012
Social Ontology as ontological inquiry about the social reality of collectives, practices, laws, material culture and other aspects of reality dependent on sociality, including humans themselves and their minds, is a rapidly evolving international field of research. Collective intentionality is one of the key concepts in social ontology in terms of which the basic constitution of all things social is nowadays discussed. It is closely related to themes like mutual belief, joint action, collective responsibility, and shared emotion. Social ontology in philosophy also draws on and contributes to research in many other disciplines, including theoretical sociology, law, economics, cognitive science, psychology, anthropology and political science. This workshop brings together Australian and international researchers working in these fields.
Keynote speakers: Kirk Ludwig (Indiana University), Seumas Miller (Charles Sturt University and the Australian National University).
Workshop: Apartheids of Mind: Effects of Injustice on Remembering and Aspiring
Date: 17 April 2012
While media accounts of criminality, corruption and immoral action often target single individuals as perpetrators, injustice does not only hinge on the actions of a single personality operating in isolation. In fact, this is perhaps the less common variety. This one-day workshop addressed how injustice becomes embedded in cultural and institutional practices to such a degree that it is normalised even as it powerfully shapes our subjectivities, our recollections, perceptions and aspirations - how in short it sets up 'apartheids of mind'.
Guest speakers included Professor Gill Straker (University of Sydney), Professor Norman Duncan (University of Witwatersrand), and Ms. Janaki Kozeluh (Sandover Group School in Alice Springs).
Workshop: Philosophy of Psychiatry
Sponsored jointly by CAVE and the ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD).
Date: 24-25 February 2012
The first day (Friday 24th) was on the theme, Depression, Autonomy and the Self, with keynote addresses by Jennifer Radden (Philosophy Department, University of Massachusetts) and Paul Biegler (Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University). Catriona Mackenzie (CAVE) responded to Jennifer Radden and Jeanette Kennett (CAVE) responded to Paul Biegler.
The second day (Sat 25th) was based around Jennifer Radden's recent book, On Delusion (Thinking in Action), with presentations by Max Coltheart, Philip Gerrans, Jakob Hohwy, Robyn Langdon and Dominic Murphy, followed by a response by Jennifer Radden.
Conference: Work and Self-Development
Date: 10-11 November 2011
Venue: Woolworths Theatre 102, Building E12
Many people are worried about work, perhaps in more complex ways than ever before.Young people entering work lack the orientation once provided by established career paths, mid-life workers are often subject to disorienting shifts in role and difficulties finding the right 'work-life' balance, and many people leaving work find their lives suddenly bereft of meaning. It is widely believed that work has become increasingly stressful and demanding over the past few decades, with rises in levels of depressive illness, psychological disorders related to low self-esteem, and even suicides, attributed to it.
Working at the intersection of philosophy, psychology and sociology, this conference set out to explore the significance of work in the formation of subjective identity. The aim was to throw light on the role of work in processes of self-formation, self-realization, and pathologies of the self by reflecting on the following issues
Keynote speakers were Professor Christophe Dejours (CNAM, Paris) and Dr Emmanuel Renault (ENS Lyon).
Thursday 10 November
09:00 - 09:15 : Morning coffee/tea
09:15 - 09:30 : Welcome
09:30 - 10:45 : Emmanuel Renault (ENS Lyon), "Identity and Autonomy at Work"
10:45 - 11:00 : Coffee/Tea
11:00 - 12:30 :
- Richard Menary (Macquarie, Philosophy and CCD), "Self-Realization and Cognitive Environments"
- Will Newsome (Macquarie, Philosophy), "Why those who study 'cognition in the wild' should care about Christophe Dejours"
- John Sutton (Macquarie, CCD), Response to Menary and Newsome
12:30 - 14:00 : Lunch
14:00 - 15:30 :
- Nick Smith (Macquarie, Philosophy), "Work as a Sphere of Norms, Paradoxes and Ideologies of Recognition"
- Jean-Philippe Deranty (Macquarie, Philosophy), "The Subject at Work: Between Psychology and Social Theory"
15:30 - 15:45 : Coffee/Tea
15:45 - 17:00 : Andrea Veltman (James Madison), "Meaningful Work and Human Flourishing"
Friday 11 November
09:00 - 09:30 : Morning cofee/tea
09:30 - 10:45 : Christophe Dejours (CNAM, Paris), "Work and Self-Development: the perspective of the psychodynamics of work"
10:45 - 11:00 : Coffee/tea
11:00 - 12:30 :
- Penelope Faure and Doris McIlwain (Macquarie, Psychology), "Retrenchment: Hitting the Reload Button rather than the Panic Button"
- Caryn Cridland (UTS), "Compassion and Mindfulness at Work"
12:30 - 14:00 : Lunch
14:00 - 15:30 :
- Michael Fine (Macquarie, Sociology), "Working for nothing: carers, volunteers and ageing"
- Dale Tweedle (Macquarie, Philosophy), "Is Call Centre Work Self-Developing? Some Paradoxes of Workplace Autonomy"
- Paula McDonald (QUT), Janis Bailey (Griffith University) and Robin Price (QUT), "Young Workers: Industrial Citizens in Waiting?"
15:30 - 15:45 : Coffee/Tea
15:45 - 17:00 : Concluding Discussion
Symposium: Testing Times: A Symposium on the Ethics and Epistemology of Animal Experimentation
Date: 20-21 September 2011
Venue: Amphitheatre 101, MGSM Conference Centre
Animal experimentation is a highly contentious practice. It generates ethical concerns due to harms to animals and epistemological worries because translations between animal experiments and human clinical medicine are problematic. In spite of these issues, the practice continues to expand. This symposium will bring together scientists, philosophers, sociologists, veterinarians and others to discuss animal experimentation and develop new approaches to the ethical and epistemological challenges it generates.
Held on the Macquarie University campus, the symposium will feature speakers from across Australia as well as abroad.
Tuesday 20 September 2011
09.00 - 09.20 : Registration, Tea and Coffee
09.20 - 09.30 : Welcome and Orientation
09.30 - 10.30 : (Chair: John Hadley)
- Ann Baldwin: "Does Lack of Enrichment Invalidate Scientific Data Obtained from Rodents by Compromising their Welfare?"
10.30 - 11.00 : Morning Tea
11.00 - 12.45 : (Chair: Brett Lidbury)
- Chris Degeling: "Veterinary Surgery as Innovation: some lessons from history"
- Imke Tammen: "Batten Disease - A Case Study"
- K-Lynn Smith: "The cognitive chicken: what captive studies reveal about intelligence"
12.45 - 14.00 : Lunch
14.00 - 15.00 : (Chair: Chris Degeling)
- Dinesh Wadiwel: "The Insect in the Box: Unpicking Freedom and Violence in Haraway's 'When Species Meet'"
- Matthew Chrulew: "The Phenomenology of Animal Life"
15.00 - 15.30 : Afternoon Tea
15.30- 16.30 : (Chair: Wendy Rogers)
- Hope Ferdowsian: "A Consideration of Harms: Ethical Imperatives Regarding the Use of Animals in Research"
16.45 - 17.30 : (Chair: K-Lynn Smith)
- Rod Bennison: "Invitation to Minding Animals 2012"
- Film: Thoughtful birds in action
17.30 - 19.00 : Drinks - Lend Lease Room 120
Wednesday 21st September 2011
09.00 - 09.30 : Registration, tea, coffee
09.30 - 10.30 : (Chair: Cynthia Townley)
- Kate Millar: "Veterinary Research and Animal Use: Examining Ethical Issues and approaches to facilitate ethical reflection"
10.30 - 11.00 : Morning Tea
11.00 - 12.45 : (Chair: Ann Baldwin)
- Brett Lidbury: "Applying Pattern Recognition Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery for Systems to Replace Rodent Models in Fundamental Research"
- Jane Johnson: "Animals-as-patients: improving the practice of animal experimentation"
- Margaret Rose: "Ethics and the science of animal welfare"
12.45 - 14.00 : Lunch
14.00 - 15.00 : (Chair: Donna Houston)
- John Hadley: "Telling it like it is: a proposal for improving transparency in biomedical research"
- Denise Russell: "Why animal ethics committees don't work"
15.00 - 15.30 : Afternoon Tea
15.30 - 17.00 : (Chair: Jane Johnson)
- Symposium Discussion - Animal Experimentation: The Status Quo and Future Directions
18.00 - 21.00 : Symposium Dinner - Whiteley Room, Campus Hub
The conference proceedings are now available as a Special Issue of the journal Between the Species
Meeting: Agency and Moral Cognition Network - Character, Capacity and Personality
Sponsored by CAVE and the Agency and Moral Cognition Network.
Date: 21 July 2011
The broad aim of the workshop is to begin to investigate how the distinction (and relationship) between the notions of capacity and character affects legal and moral assessments of responsibility, sentencing decisions, and medical treatment options. Should people with serious personality disorders (for example, psychopathy) be described as suffering from mental capacity deficits or personality/character flaws? How might our description of their condition (i.e. as involving either incapacities or character flaws) bear on their responsibility (i.e. excuse or condemnation, sentencing, parole, etc), and on whether medical treatments for their condition should be developed, offered, and maybe even sometimes justifiably compelled.
Symposium: Neurolaw: The Science of Mind Meets the Body of Law
Hosted by the Centre for Legal Governance, with funding and support by CAVE.
Date: 16 July 2011
Workshop: Neurolaw in Australia - revealing the hidden impact of neuroscience and behavioural genetics on Australian law
Date: 14-15 July 2011
Hosted on the Macquarie University campus, this two-day workshop will include presentations by international and local experts and discussions of cutting edge working papers. There will also be special sessions designed to build-up a picture of how neuroscience and behavioural genetics are affecting Australian law and to develop a common Australian neurolaw research agenda.
Workshop: Agent Tracking and Its Disorders: A Multidisciplinary Workshop on the Identification and Tracking of Human Individuals
Date: 17, 20-21 June 2011
Recent research has investigated (i) the perceptual and attentional tracking of animates or inanimates, (ii) the tracking of referents of terms such as indexicals or demonstratives, (iii) the ontogeny of conceptual identification, (iv) the modularity and evolutionary history of folk psychology and agent tracking, (v) the pathologies of human beliefs about personal identity, and (vi) the characteristics of scientific reasoning akin to tracking or truth-tracking. Drawing on the insights provided by these studies, this workshop is aimed at addressing two fundamental problems. First, how do such variegated kinds of tracking support our ability to interact with others and understand their actions or mental states? Second, how do errors or dysfunctions in agent tracking relate to cognitive or social disorders? This workshop will be held on the Macquarie University campus and will feature an outstanding list of local and international speakers. It will include a keynote address by Professor Peter Carruthers (University of Maryland).
Link to the conference website:
Workshop: Mechanisms and Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science
Date: 16-17 December 2010
Organised by Peter Menzies (mqrCAVE) and Kellie Williamson (Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science), the keynote speaker at this event was Prof Wiliam Bechtel (UN San Diego). Other speakers included Lise Andersen (Macquarie University), Paul Griffith (Sydney University), Jakob Hohwy (Monash University), Patrick McGivern (University of Wollongong), Peter Menzies (Macquarie University), Dominic Murphy (Sydney University), Jon Opie (University of Adelaide), John Sutton (Macquarie University),Kaorola Stotz (Sydney University) and Kellie Williamson (Macquarie University).
Workshop: Normativity and the Law
Date: 15 June 2010
Keynote Speaker: Prof. Stanley Paulson (Washington University Law School)
Respondents: Dr. Carlos Bernal-Pulido (Macquarie), Dr. Paul Formosa (Macquarie), Dr. Iain Stewart (Macquarie)
Workshop: Narrative Approaches to the Self
Date: 12 December 2009
Hosted in collaboration with the Philosophy Program, the University of Wollongong and the Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, keynote speakers at this event included Shaun Gallagher (Florida State) and Dan Hutto (Hertfordshire).
Workshop and seminar: Foucault on Neoliberalism
Date: 3 December 2009
Using a relevant text circulated beforehand, this event featured an informal workshop discussion with the distinguished Foucault scholar Dr. Miguel de Beistegui (Warwick University).
Workshop: The Cutting Edge of Innovation Treatments: The Hazards of Progress
Hosted by Macquarie University's Faculty of Arts and the Australian School of Advanced Medicine.
Date: 28 November 2009
Issues discussed included
- When is a new operation an experiment?
- How do we know if a new device is safe?
- Should patients be told when their doctor tries novel procedures?
- How should innovative practice be regulated?
Colin Thomson (Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Wollongong) led a discussion of these issues using an hypothetical case and drawing on a distinguished panel of experts.
Conference: ASCS 2009: The 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science
Date: 30 September - 2 October 2009
Keynote speakers at this conference included Stephen Crain (Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science), Jakob Hohwy (Philosophy Department, Monash University), Jason Mattingley (Queensland Brain Institute, University of Queensland), Thomas Metzinger (Philosophy Department, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz and the Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin) and Barbara Tversky (Psychology Department, Stanford University and Columbia University).
Conference Proceedings can be found at:
Conference: Vulnerability, Agency and Justice
Co-hosted by Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics; Faculty of Arts, University of Tasmania; Faculty of Arts, University of Wollongong
Date: 13-15 August 2009
Held on the Macquarie campus, speakers at this conference included Gillian Brock (Auckland), Marilyn Friedman (Vanderbilt), Amy Mullin (Toronto) and Margaret Walker (Arizona State).
Workshop: Current Issues in Collective Responsibility
Date: 21-22 November 2008
Invited speakers: Prof. Larry May (Washington University, St. Louise and CAPPE, ANU); Prof. Marilyn Friedman (Washington University, St. Louise and CAPPE, ANU); Prof. Tony Coady (CAPPE, University of Melbourne); Prof. Janna Thomson (La Trobe University)
Respondents: Dr. Justine McGill (University of Sydney); A/Prof. Catriona Mackenzie (Macquarie); Emeritus Professor Genevieve Lloyd (UNSW and Macquarie); Dr. Ian Tregenza (Macquarie)
Conference: Emotions, Imagination and Moral Reasoning
Co-sponsored by MACCS and Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics
Date: 5-7 September 2008
Invited Speakers: Prof. Bertram Malle (Brown University), Prof. Victoria McGeer (Princeton University); Prof. Peter Goldie & Chloe Fitzgerald (University of Manchester); Professor Mark Dadds (UNSW) & Dr. David Hawes (University of Sydney); A/Prof. Jeanette Kennett (CAPPE, Australian National University); Dr Marc de Rosnay (University of Sydney); Dr Neil Levy (CAPPE, University of Melbourne); Dr Ian Ravenscroft (Flinders University); Dr. Doris McIllwain (Psychology, Macquarie); A/Prof. Catriona Mackenzie (Macquarie); Dr. Robyn Langdon (Macquarie); Prof. John Sutton (Macquarie).
Publication: R. Langdon and C. Mackenzie (eds), 2011. Emotions, Imagination and Moral Reasoning, (New York: Psychology Press).
Seminar: Shane O'Neill (Queen's University Belfast), "The Fabric of Global Justice: Freedom, Recognition, Decolonization"
CAVE Seminar: Friday 26 August 2016
Shane O'Neill (Queen's University Belfast)
"The Fabric of Global Justice: Freedom, Recognition, Decolonization"
Time: 14:00 - 15:30
Venue: W6A 127
Abstract: In this paper, I advance an immanent yet radical theory of global justice. This account seeks to move beyond an increasingly sterile debate between egalitarian, cosmopolitan proceduralists and their liberal nationalist critics. The alternative is based on the struggle for mutual recognition among self-determining political societies in a post-colonial world order. A method of normative reconstruction is adopted, following Axel Honneth’s Hegelian investigation of the criteria of social justice immanent within three spheres of freedom in modern Western liberal democratic societies. The limits of Honneth’s account of democratic ethical life in the nation-state, and of freedom in the modern world, is exposed and shown to be in need of extension and revision. In taking due account of colonial and neo-colonial injustices that cross and transcend state boundaries, international relations are presented as an additional sphere of modern freedom with its own immanent standards of justice. The fabric, or material, of global justice is constituted by asymmetrical relations between political societies confronted by a range of significant, shared, human challenges of injustice in an interdependent, globalizing world marked by differing experiences of modernity. Most societies struggle to substantiate self-determining freedom in the face of contemporary neo-colonial power and an enduring legacy of colonialism. While citizens within each society engage in practices that promise greater realisation of their social freedom, these societies are themselves mired in regional and global struggles in which they seek to realise political freedom for their peoples and equal respect in the world order.
Shane's profile is available on our Visitors page.
All welcome, no registration required!
Seminar: Robert Audi (Notre Dame), "Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification"
CAVE Seminar: Thursday 26 May 2016
Robert Audi (Notre Dame)
"Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification"
Time: 15:00 - 16:30
Venue: W6A 107
Abstract: Twentieth-century epistemology might be plausibly considered predominantly atomistic, focusing mainly on individual beliefs and instances of knowledge of specific propositions. Since at least the 1990s, however, we have seen progressively more theorizing in which the focus is holistic, with elements of intellectual character receiving intensive study and taken to clarify conditions under which individual beliefs are justified or constitute knowledge. This essay is primarily concerned with intellectual character. It assumes that knowledge and justification are importantly different concerns of epistemology and pursues the question whether we might fruitfully distinguish intellectual virtues in relation to the relative importance of these two elements in their constitution. It is argued that some intellectual virtues might be fruitfully considered knowledge-based, whereas others are plausibly viewed as justification-based and still others have a more complicated basis. The paper also explores the manifestations, as distinct from the basis, of intellectual traits. The result is an outline of an account of intellectual virtue and, in that light, a wider conception of intellectual character than the leading conceptions of it presented in recent epistemological literature.
All welcome, no registration required.
Seminar: Michael Brady (Glasgow), "Painfulness, Desire, and Reasons"
CAVE Seminar: Tuesday 12 April 2016
Michael Brady (Glasgow)
"Painfulness, Desire, and Reasons"
Time: 12:00 - 13:30
Venue: W6A 708
Abstract: What makes pains painful? The desire view of painfulness holds that painfulness is an extrinsic quality of pain sensations; these count as painful because the subject desires that they cease. The view faces a number of serious objections, the most devastating of which is a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma. At the heart of this criticism is the claim that desires lack the normative force to enable the desire view to capture what is supposed to be a platitude about painfulness, namely that it gives one a normative reason to act so that the sensation ceases. In this paper I argue that the desire view can respond to this challenge and capture the normativity of painfulness.
All welcome, no registration required.
Seminar: Albert Newen (Bochum), "The Individuation and Recognition of Emotion"
Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Work-in-Progress Seminar: Tuesday 15 March 2016
Albert Newen (Bochum)
"The Individuation and Recognition of Emotion"
Time: 13:00 - 14:00
Venue: W6A 107
In the metaphysical debate we have two extreme positions: emotions are individuated as social constructs (Lutz 1986, Harré 1986), on the one hand, or they are individuated as evolutionary anchored affect programs (Ekman 1972, Griffith 1997), on the other. Both accounts have severe deficits. Let us mention only the two main deficits: psychoevolutionary accounts state that shared evolutionary history is the only criteria to identify types of emotions. They do not provide any classificatory schemes which do not refer to each category's evolutionary history but for many emotion categories referred to not only in everyday speech but also in psychological theories, it is far from clear whether their members share the same evolutionary history. Thus, the psychoevolutionary account has difficulties providing adequate classificatory schemes, for example for studying emotions in a social context. In principle, psychoevolutionary accounts of emotions can easily account for basic emotions but have problems to account for the role of cognitive contents in so-called cognitive emotions (author 2008). On the other hand, the social constructionist can easily account for the latter including the cultural variety of emotion phenomena but they underestimate the strong overlap of the emotion repertoire despite the cultural variation. Here Ekman (1972) has shown that basic emotions like joy, fear, anger, sadness etc. are accompanied with the same facial expression. There is an open debate which phenomena are basic emotions but a strong part of the community presupposes that there are basic emotions which are evolutionary old, shared with animals and develop early in ontogeny (Ekman 1999, Griffiths 1997). The evolutionary anchor of basic emotions constraints our emotion repertoire and undermines the social constructivist view that emotions are entirely created by cultural factors. What could be an alternative? We need to do justice to both features, the evolutionary anchor of basic emotions and the cultural dependence of some emotions. I suggest that the claim that emotions are individuated as pattern is the best alternative: 1. pattern can easily involve both, evolutionary anchored as well as culturally shaped features and thus account for both observations; 2. this view especially helps to distinguish emotion concepts in a society and their natural basis, i.e. some emotions concepts are categorizing only conventional constructs while others are actually anchored in natural kinds (which empirical science has to discover). 2. The account of emotion as pattern is nicely connecting with our folk psychological way of thinking about emotions (noticing the many faces of emotions), 3. the best reductive scientific accounts of emotions have (at least so far) not succeeded in reducing emotions to a very few necessary features which are constituting a type of emotion. In the second part of the talk, I argue that emotion recognition relies on the same type of pattern recognition as is typical for object recognition.
Reference: Newen, A., Welpinghus, A., Juckel, G. (2015): Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception. Mind & Language 30(2), 187-208.
Seminar: Katsunori Miyahara (Rikkyo), "How the skin makes me me: A phenomenological analysis of itch experience"
Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Work-in-Progress Seminar: Tuesday 8 March 2016
Katsunori Miyahara (Rikkyo)
"How the skin makes me me: A phenomenological analysis of itch experience"
Time: 13:00 - 14:00
Venue: W6A 107
ABSTRACT: How do sense experiences shape our conscious experience? The common view in both philosophy and the natural sciences of the mind has it that sense experiences are something given to the experiencing self. The aim of this talk is to outline an alternative to this view based on phenomenological analyses of two types of skin sense: itch and pain. In line with the common view, in the medical science, itch is typically defined as an uneasy sensation that causes in us the desire to scratch. By developing a preliminary phenomenological analysis of itch experience based on my own experience of Atopic Dermatitis, and in comparison to existing analyses on pain experience, I describe how itch experience involves a dynamical structure responsible for the maintenance and breakdown of the embodied self, rather than just being a sense experience given to a prefixed self.
All welcome, no registration required!
Luke Russell (Sydney), "Forgiving Under Ignorance"
Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Work-in-Progress Seminar: Tuesday 3 November 2015
Luke Russell (Sydney)
"Forgiving Under Ignorance"
Time: 13:00 - 14:00
Venue: W3A 501
Should we accept that the victim herself is best positioned to know whether she has forgiven the perpetrator? Often victims of wrongdoing do not know much about the perpetrator, especially about his current attitude towards the wrong action in question. Victims might also be ignorant of relevant facts regarding their own emotional dispositions and their own motives. In this talk I ask whether these kinds of ignorance are a barrier that prevents us from forgiving, and whether they make forgiveness epistemically opaque to the would-be forgiver.
Heidi Maibom (Cincinnati), "Reenactment, counterfactual reasoning, and empathy."
Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Tuesday 20 October 2015
Heidi Maibom (Cincinnati)
"Reenactment, counterfactual reasoning, and empathy"
Time: 13:00 - 14:30
Venue: W3A 501
Perspective taking facilitates or has special powers to induce empathy. It is tempting to assume that it is something about the recreative stance—its subjectivity, the livedness of the thing—that has such special powers. But there are reasons to think we don’t reenact, even in our own case when we imagine something or other. What we do instead is that we think of what our reaction ought to be. This now raises the question of how we explain the special powers of perspective taking? What matters are a number of closely related things: disengaging from own construal of the situation, appreciating the possibility of multiple perspectives on the situation, and getting to a level of description where one sees more clearly the difficulty involved. What matters in perspective taking is not a subjective, re-lived element, but a different construal of the situation.
Jennifer Radden (University of Massachusetts Boston), "Folly, Melancholy, Madnesse are but one disease: Feelings and Reasoning Norms in the Anatomy of Melancholy and today's Mind Sciences"
Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Tuesday 13 October 2015
Jennifer Radden (University of Massachusetts Boston)
"Folly, Melancholy, Madnesse are but one disease: Feelings and Reasoning Norms in the Anatomy of Melancholy and today's Mind Sciences"
Time: 13:00 - 14:30
Venue: W3A 501
Relying on Stoic philosophical ideas, Burton's Anatomy (1621) presents the case that the unavoidable sadness and sorrow we feel in response to life's vicissitudes are matched by, and tied to, unavoidably errant and mistaken reasoning. In this respect, I show, the Anatomy anticipates findings and debates in the mind sciences of today. Disputes over distresses that are normal and adaptive rather than pathological ("normal sadness," not depression), are the focus of one of these; the second involves the finding that bias and inaccuracy are built into the structure of normal thought patterns. Using Stoic ideas, Burton links the norms guiding feeling and reasoning, and the aim of this paper is to critically evaluate that relationship and the Stoic claims in light of contemporary discussions.
Marc Lewis (Radboud), "Throwing out the brain with the bathwater? What neuroscience can teach us about recovery in addiction"
CAVE Seminar: Monday 7 September
Marc Lewis (Radboud)
"Throwing out the brain with the bathwater? What neuroscience can teach us about recovery in addiction"
Time: 14:00 - 16:00
Venue: W6A 708
Kristin Andrews (York University), "What does it mean to call a chimpanzee a person?"
Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Friday 6 February
Kristin Andrews (York University)
"What does it mean to call a chimpanzee a person?"
Time: 10:30 - 12:00
Venue: W6A 107
Recent lawsuits in the US and Argentina are promoting the idea that other great apes should also be considered persons. This idea can sound odd, given the tendency to equate "person" with "human". I will show that these concepts come apart, and offer reasons for thinking it makes sense to call great apes (and members of many other species) persons. Finally, I will examine some of the implications for research on great apes and cetaceans given the conclusion that they can be persons.
Mary Rawlinson (Stony Brook University), "Eating at the Heart of Ethics"
CAVE Seminar: Wednesday 17 December
Mary Rawlinson (Stony Brook University)
"Eating at the Heart of Ethics"
Time: 13.00 - 15.00
Venue: W6A 708
While no human being can escape the ethical dimension of food, what and how we eat is not simply a matter of individual choice. A focus on individual responsibility ignores the dependency of human agency on a culture of possibilities. The philosophical approach to eating as a matter of personal virtue and choice elides the structural and historical determinants of what and how we eat, at the same time that it deflects the political strategies and collaborations necessary to install and sustain infrastructures adequate to the just production and distribution of wholesome food. Agribusiness appears efficient, because its costs in environmental degradation, malnutrition, and social dislocation are not assessed, while it depends on invisible underpaid labour, as well as an ethically unsustainable treatment of animals.
An ethics and politics that begins with the right to property or the rational calculation of goods will see food as a commodity like any other, but what is actually universal in human experience is the double dependency on the mother and on food. Everyone is born of a woman and everyone needs to eat. What are the ethical implications of this universal dependency? This universal dependency, I argue, requires respect for the conditions of life: the land and the elements that sustain life ; the generativity of the seed that guarantees the sustenance of future generations; the animals who live and work with humans and are regularly sacrificed; and the women and men who work in the field, as well as the generations of women who have saved the seed and created the history of cooking.
Terroir as state policy realizes some of these values and has proven effective in preserving the landscape and environment, while supporting local farming and local culinary institutions. It sustains a social life that effectively preserves and mediates regional differences within a highly centralized French state. Bread, wine, and cheese, the "Sacré Trinité," provide a field of pleasure and knowledge shared across classes.
Does terroir offer a practical political strategy for changing the culture of possibilities?
Heather Draper (University of Birmingham), "An empirically informed ethical framework for social care robots for older people."
CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Friday 24 October
Heather Draper (University of Birmingham)
"An empirically informed ethical framework for social care robots for older people."
Time: 10:00 - 12:00
Venue: W6A 107
This talk is based on the results of the ethics research for ACCOMPANY (Accompanyproject.eu), a robotics project funded by the European Commission FP7 ITC programme. Robots are being developed to support people who may otherwise be unable to do so, to continue to live in their own homes. The target user group for ACCOMPANY is older people who are not significantly cognitively impaired. The ACCOMPANY robot is supposed to be re-enabling as well as supportive; this means that it is supposed to help the older person recover and maintain functions that enable them to live independently. With this in mind, a set of values was proposed to govern the development and programming of the robot. These values included autonomy, independence, enablement, safety, privacy and social connectedness. 21 focus groups were then convened in three countries (the UK, the Netherlands and France) with older people, and the formal and informal carers of older people to determine whether they thought additional values should be considered and how tensions between the existing values should be resolved. The paper will present and discuss the results.
Andrew Moore (University of Otago), "The job of 'ethics committees'"
CAVE Seminar: Friday 29 August 2014
Andrew Moore (University of Otago)
"The job of 'ethics committees'"
Time: 14:30 - 16:30
Venue: W6A 708
This paper, co-authored with Andrew Donnelly (Sydney), asks what job it is best to give research committees, and distinguishes the job 'review for ethical acceptability' from the job 'review against policy standards.' It then argues that the latter and not the former is the best job to give these committees, and argues on this basis for substantial reform.
This paper will be responded to by CAVE members, Kandy White and Mianna Lotz, and will then be opened to the floor for general discussion.
Andrew Moore (University of Otago), "Objective Wellbeing"
CAVE Seminar: Tuesday 26 August 2014
Andrew Moore (University of Otago)
Time: 14:00 - 16:00
Venue: W6A 720
This paper sets out a strong/radical form of objectivist pluralism about individual well-being, which it develops and defends in the face of eleven leading published objections to theories of its type.
This session will be a discussion around Andrew Moore's paper, "Objective Wellbeing". The paper will be circulated beforehand.
Kevin Toh (San Francisco State University), "The Place of Social Practices in Our Normative Lives"
Joint CAVE/Centre for Legal Governance/Macquarie Law School Seminar: Monday 16 June 2014
Kevin Toh (San Francisco State University)
"The Place of Social Practices in our Normative Lives"
Time: 1.00pm - 2.00pm
Venue: W3A 501
Abstract: The distinction between what we ought to do anyway on the one hand, and what we ought to do because of our practices on the other seems to have been a perennial philosophical concern. And as befits a perennial philosophical concern, the distinction has proved stubbornly elusive and difficult to pin down. Recently, in a thought-provoking and vigorously-argued paper, Nicholas Southwood (2011) has pursued the query in terms of the distinction between morality and conventions, or more specifically between moral judgments and conventional normative judgments; and he has proposed a way of characterizing this distinction that he deems superior to some common and influential alternatives. According to Southwood, appeals to social practices, or "what is done", are necessary non-derivative grounds for conventional normative judgments, whereas such appeals can only be derivative grounds for moral judgments. In effect, I argue, Southwood is characterizing us as invariably treating social practices as having final extrinsic values when we make conventional normative judgments. In assessing and questioning Southwood's proposal, I shall scrutinize and question a view that seems to have become an orthodoxy in contemporary normative ethics -- namely, the view that there is a clear, qualitative distinction between final extrinsic and non-final extrinsic values.
Emmanuel Renault (Paris, Nanterre), "Marx's Critique of the Market"
CAVE Seminar: Friday 13 June 2014
Emmanuel Renault (Paris, Nanterre)
"Marx's Critique of the Market"
Time: 2.00pm - 4.00pm
Venue: W6A 708
Prof. Emmanuel Renault will present his paper, entitled "Marx's Critique of the Market."
Emmanuel Renault (Paris, Nanterre), "Social Self and Work in The Phenomenology of Spirit"
CAVE Seminar: Tuesday 10 June 2014
Emmanuel Renault (Paris, Nanterre)
"Social Self and Work in The Phenomenology of Spirit"
Time: 11.00am - 1.00pm
Venue: W6B 357
This will be a discussion group that grows out of the reading session on this paper, held on May 27. Participants are invited to read the paper prior to this discussion seminar and come along to discuss the paper and the issues it raises with Prof. Renault. (If you are unable to attend the reading session, please feel free to still come along to this discussion.)
Monique Crane (Macquarie), "Moral Distress in the Workplace"
CAVE Seminar: Friday 23 May 2014
Monique Crane (Department of Psychology, Macquarie University)
"Moral Distress in the Workplace"
Time: 10.00am - 12.00pm
Venue: W6A 708
Dr. Crane is a lecturer in Organisational Psychology at Macquarie University. Her primary research concerns how organisations foster psychological resilience in the workplace. Her talk will be concerned with issues of distress in the workplace.
Abstract: "My research examines the role of moral distress as an important occupational stressor. Despite the importance of moral distress in the nursing scholarship, little attention has been paid to the phenomena in the psychological literature as an occupational stressor effecting broader industries. A factor possibly limiting the application of moral distress to other occupational settings is its definitional features. First, a current necessary condition of moral distress is the acknowledgement prior to behaviour initiation, that behaviour will contravene personal moral ideals. Second, the definition of moral distress specifies that the inability to act in accordance with one's moral framework is driven by institutional constraints (non-autonomous behaviour). The first study examined the appropriateness of the currently well-used definition of moral distress to medical doctors. Fourteen Australian medical doctors participated in a semi-structured interview regarding occupational morally distressing events. The findings of this paper suggest that moral distress is not constrained in its definition in the two above noted ways and makes recommendations to resolve this issue.
A second study, examined individual characteristics that may make some people more vulnerable to the experience of moral distress. This study examined a cross-section of 540 Australian-registered veterinarians (63.8% female), ranging in age from 23 to 74. The results revealed a trend for the perceived moral significance of stressors to be negatively related to the experience of stress and negative arousal emotions. However, the perceived moral significance of stressors were not independently associated with deteriorations in psychological functioning. Trait perfectionism tended to moderate the relationship between morally significant stressors and declines in functioning and psychological resilience. The data presented suggests that trait perfectionism may be an individual difference that enhances vulnerability to morally challenging events in veterinary practice."
Kathryn Millard (Macquarie University), "Revisioning Obedience: Stanley Milgram's laboratory drama"
CAVE Seminar: Friday 3 May 2013
Professor Kathryn Millard (Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies, Macquarie University)
"Revisioning Obedience: Stanley Milgram's laboratory drama"
Time: 1.00pm - 3.30 pm
Venue: W6A 708
Stanley Milgram's documentary Obedience (1965) is widely understood as the scientific record of a social psychology experiment. Yet it presents audio-visual footage of only 1 condition out of the more than 30 Milgram conducted. Far from blindly obeying authority, in some conditions up to 90% of participants disobeyed. Drawing on extensive archival research, this presentation looks behind the scenes at Milgram's obedience studies and film. Were they science? Or theatre? Milgram claimed his studies as evidence that most of us do as we're told. But do we?
Kathryn Millard is a writer, filmmaker and academic. In 2012, she was Visiting Fellow in Film Studies at Yale University. Kathryn's most recent film Random 8 (2012) dramatised sociologist Bill Gamson's 'Encounters with Unjust Authorities' experiment which challenged Stanley Milgram's findings.
On the film Random 8 see www.random8thefilm.com
Arto Laitinen (University of Jyväskylä), "Problems and Promises in the Philosophy of Recognition"
CAVE Seminar: Tuesday 12 March 2013
Professor Arto Laitinen (University of Jyväskylä, Finland)
"Problems and Promises in the Philosophy of Recognition"
Time: 2.00pm - 3.30 pm
Venue: W6A 107
Arto Laitinen is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä (Finland), adjunct professor in social and moral philosophy in University of Helsinki, and from June 2013 Professor in Philosophy at the University of Tampere. His recent publications include the monograph Strong Evaluation without Moral Sources. On Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics (Walter de Gruyter, 2008), edited collections Hegel on Action (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Recognition and Social Ontology (Brill, 2011), and numerous articles on Hegel, recognition, solidarity and social ontology.
Arto Laitinen (University of Jyväskylä), "Declarations, Deontic Powers and Directions of Fit: On Searle's Social Ontology"
CAVE Seminar: Tuesday 12 March 2013
Professor Arto Laitinen (University of Jyväskylä, Finland)
"Declarations, Deontic Powers and Directions of Fit: On Searle's Social Ontology"
Time: 10.00am - 12.00pm
Venue: W6A 708
Robert McKay (Sheffielf University), Anat Pick (Queen Mary College), Tom Tyler (Oxford Brookes University), "Otherwise than Being Human: Three Talks on Non-anthropocentric Collectivity and Ethical Agency"
CAVE Seminar: Monday 10 December 2012
Dr Robert McKay (Sheffield University)
Dr Anat Pick (Queen Mary College, London) and
Dr Tom Tyler (Oxford Brookes University)
"Otherwise than Being Human: Three Talks on Non‐anthropocentric Collectivity and Ethical Agency"
Time: 2.00pm ‐ 4.30 pm
Venue: W6A 708
Animals, Violence and Moral Agency in Post‐war Cinema: Marilyn Monroe, Velma Johnston, Arthur Miller, and John Huston's "The Misfits"
Recent reappraisals of "The Misfits" fail to engage with its most direct historical context: the development of animal welfare statute outlawing mustang hunting-legislation initiated in Nevada in 1953 and incorporated into Federal Code during pre‐production of the film in 1959. The legislative discussion was couched in terms of a universal humanism that clearly announced American moral ascendancy. The film, however, explores how animal ethics might emerge from much more disheartened view of America and the obsolescence of such values in the post‐war. I will read the presentation of Roslyn/Monroe, the pro‐animal voice of the film, against her real‐life counterpart: Velma Johnston, the Nevadan rancher who conceived and orchestrated the campaign for the 1959 legislation. After explaining how the hostile contemporary reaction to the film sought to foreclose its most radical elements, I will analyse a number of key moments in the film, including the film's most astonishing cinematic event-a long shot in which Roslyn screams at the hunters, indicting them as 'Killers! Murderers!'. This, I will argue, is a key site of the film's challenge to anthropocentric ethics in the post‐war. In turn, I will show how "The Misfits" complicates and exceeds, but in other ways undermines, both Johnston's politically effective humanitarianism and Monroe's own outrage that the film reduced Roslyn's (and her own) moral testimony to hysteria.
Robert McKay is Lecturer in English Literature and Faculty of Arts Assistant Director of Learning and Teaching at the University of Sheffield. He has published on the animal politics of contemporary literature and film and cofounded the Animal Studies Group, with whom he published Killing Animals (Illinois UP, 2006).
Animals Between Love and Law: Veganism and Animal Ethics
As an alternative to the dominant Utilitarian and rights‐based models, animal ethics has turned to the Continental philosophies of Levinas and Derrida that welcome and revere Otherness. Whereas Utilitarianism relies on a "closed" system of ethical calculations, the Levinasian model remains open‐ended. This paper combines Levinasian openness, the disposition Matthew Calarco describes as "ethical agnosticism," with a closed approach that sees ethics as embodied in particular modes of practice. Veganism, I argue, is precisely such a practice that avoids predetermining the limits of moral consideration yet it insists on the social and normative dimensions of ethical responsiveness and so offers a tacit critique of the ethics of alterity. Veganism is located between transcendence and immanence, between love and law. My discussion responds in particular to Donna Haraway, who rejects veganism as purist and otherworldly, antithetical to the mode of "becoming with" that underlies what it means to cohabit the world with "companion species." I recast veganism as a practice of the "broken middle," a phrase I am borrowing from the philosopher and sociologist Gillian Rose, whose work was concerned with moving beyond either‐or versions of transcendence and immanence and so found itself in the realm of the middle‐not the space of compromise or acquiescence, but of struggle and work. Veganism, I will try to show, is the labour of love and justice, no less worldly than Haraway's multispecies earthly entanglements.
Anat Pick is Lecturer in Film Studies at Queen Mary University of London. Her research centres on Continental approaches to animals, vegan animal ethics, and the zoomorphism of image and text. Anat's book "Creaturely Poetics: Animality and Vulnerability in Literature and Film" is published by Columbia University Press (2011) and she is coeditor of "Screening Nature: Cinema Beyond the Human" (Berghahn, 2013). She is currently working on a new book project on Continental philosophy & the idea of the committed life.
Merely Human or More than Human? Our Animal Collectivities
Sartre's account of bad faith describes the practice by which individuals deceive themselves into believing that the identity on which they have settled fully defines and delineates them. A particular form of bad faith is to be found in the work of diverse writers, academic and otherwise, who persistently self‐identify as human, thereby acknowledging only a narrow, limited part of themselves. In order to complicate this over‐hasty, anthroponormative self‐conception, I outline a number of alternative, nonhuman collectivities to which we each belong. Looking at family trees and taxonomies, at the colour vision ofdogs and doves, and at the sexual proclivities of hedgehogs and dolphins, can help us to move beyond an impoverished self‐identification as merely human.
Tom Tyler is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Culture at Oxford Brookes University, UK. He has published widely on animals and anthropocentrism, and is the editor of Animal Beings (Parallax 38, 2006), the co‐editor of Animal Encounters (Brill, 2009), and the author of CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers (Minnesota UP, 2012).
Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis), "Autonomy, Self-Agency and Social Interaction"
CAVE Seminar: Friday 7 December 2012
Professor Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis)
"Autonomy, Self-Agency and Social Interaction"
Time: 11.00 am
Venue: Senate Room, 3rd floor, Lincoln Building, C8A
The interaction theory of social cognition (IT) argues that the strong interaction processes that contribute to or constitute social cognition have a certain autonomy of their own which cannot be reduced to processes found within the individuals who interact. Developmental studies show that intercorporeal and intersubjective interactions begin early in life. If this is so, it motivates the question about the possibility and extent of individual self-agency and autonomy. Recent debates about free will (whether for or against) are framed by internalist models of cognition. It suggests that an externalist/enactivist model is required to rethink the concepts of autonomy, self-agency and free will. I'll outline aspects of this model and argue that it is consistent with the concept of phronesis.
Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis), Dan Hutto (University of Hertfordshire), Somogy Varga (University of Memphis), "Social Ontology, Critical Theory and Extended Minds"
CAVE Seminar: Thursday 6 December 2012
Professors Shaun Gallagher (Memphis), Dan Hutto (University of Hertfordshire) and Somogy Varga (University of Memphis)
"Social Ontology, Critical Theory and Extended Minds"
Time: 2.00pm - 5.00pm
Venue: Boyd Room, Central Hub
Vikki Entwistle (University of Dundee), "Doing Philosophy with Clinicians and Patients: Reflections on a 'Knowledge Exchange' Project"
CAVE Seminar: Tuesday 27 November 2012
Professor Vikki Entwistle (University of Dundee)
"Doing philosophy with clinicians and patients: reflections on a 'knowledge exchange' project"
Time: 3.30 pm
Venue: W6A 708
Vikki Entwistle writes: In this seminar I will discuss my experiences of a small project that was commissioned by a charitable trust that works to improve the quality of health care to explore "philosophical issues in the co-production of health". My co-investigator and I approached the trust with the notions that (a) some of the prevailing ways of thinking about how clinicians and people with long term health conditions do and should work together were not adequate to support the kinds of quality improvement that the charitable trust (and others) aspired to and (b) ideas from philosophical work on relational accounts of autonomy and on capabilities might support the development of more useful ways of thinking. The project involved a combination of research scholarship, philosophical analyses and conversational engagement with people who provide, support and experience healthcare services relating to the management of long term health conditions. We enjoyed the process and think we will deliver 'products' that both we and the commissioning organisations can be pleased with, but there are a number of uncertainties and issues with this way of working. I hope that discussion of these uncertainties and issues during the seminar will allow us all to develop our understanding of 'applying' philosophy for public good.
Heidi M. Hurd (University of Illinois), Ralph Brubaker (University of Illinois),"Debts and the Demands of Conscience: The Moral Underpinnings of Bankruptcy Law"
Joint CAVE/CLG Seminar: Monday 3 September 2012
Heidi M. Hurd (University of Illinois) and Ralph Brubaker (University of Illinois)
"Debts and the Demands of Conscience: The Moral Underpinnings of Bankruptcy Law"
Time: 1.00 pm
Venue: The Blackshield Room, W3A 501
The seminar took its title from a recent book co-authored by Professors Hurd and Brubaker. They presented the central thesis of the book for discussion.
Antony Duff (University of Stirling), "Crimes and Torts"
Joint CAVE/CLG Seminar: Wednesday 25 July 2012
Antony Duff (University of Stirling)
"Crimes and Torts"
Time: 1.00pm - 2.00 pm
Venue: The Blackshield Room, W3A 501
Antony Duff writes:
It is easy enough to sketch an idealised distinction between criminal law and tort law, and to draw from it ideal paradigms of crimes and of torts.
- Criminal law is focused on wrongs (even if, for those who espouse the Harm Principle, it is properly concerned only with harmful wrongs); tort law is focused on harms (even if, for those who eschew strict liability, it is properly concerned only with wrongful harms).
- Criminal law ascribes responsibility for past wrongdoing in a way that renders the agent liable to formal censure and punishment; tort law ascribes responsibility for past harm-causing in a way that renders the agent liable to pay compensatory damages.
- Criminal law is 'public' law in the sense that criminal cases are brought and controlled by 'the public' ('State', 'People', Commonwealth', or in less advanced polities 'Queen'): the (alleged) victim does not have the right to decide whether the case is pursued or the punishment exacted. Tort law is 'private' law in the sense that tort cases are brought and controlled by the (alleged) victim, either individual or corporate: she decided whether to bring or pursue the case, and whether to enforce any order for damages.
(In our actual legal worlds, of course, this distinction is very much messier.)
This distinction, or set of distinctions, between crimes and torts raises three kinds of question.
- Should we operate with both kinds of law; or should we seek to abolish one (as so-called abolitionists seek to abolish criminal law)?
- If we are to sustain (something like) criminal law and (something like) tort law, how are we to decide which kinds of matter should fall under each (or, of course, under both)? Is there any principled way of deciding what should count as crime, and what should count (only) as tort?
- Must the three sets of defining features noted above always go together? Or could we e.g. give victims more control of a criminal process (as with private prosecutions); or allow tort cases to lead to censure and punishment (as with punitive damages); or have criminal cases lead to victim-oriented compensation rather than punishment?
This paper will begin to explore these questions.
Beate Roessler (University of Amsterdam), "Authenticity of Cultures and of Persons"
CAVE Seminar: Thursday 24 November 2011
Roessler (University of Amsterdam)
"Authenticity of Cultures and of Persons"
Time: 2.00pm - 4.30pm
Venue: W6A 708
Beate Roessler writes: In this paper I argue that it does not make sense - either empirically or normatively - to speak of 'authentic' cultures. All we need when talking about cultures is a relatively weak concept that still carries enough normative weight to function as the meaningful background of a person's identity, autonomy and good life. Discussing the authentic culture, I refer to the debates around the German Leitkultur as well as the Dutch populist movement as examples. However, I am interested not only in the concept of the authenticity of a culture but also in the concept of the authenticity of persons: if an 'authentic culture' is not feasible, does this have repercussions on the concept of the autonomy and authenticity of persons? In suggesting that this might be the case, I argue that persons can be autonomous without always being fully authentic.
Jocelyn Downie (Dalhousie University), "End of Life Law and Policy: A New Arena for Restorative Justice"
CAVE Seminar: Friday 30 September 2011
Jocelyn Downie (Dalhousie University)
"End of Life Law and Policy: A New Arena for Restorative Justice"
Time: 1.30pm - 3.30pm
Venue: W6A 708
Jocelyn Downie writes: In this talk I will suggest that restorative justice might provide a new direction and a new way to resolve some of the myriad problems with the current approach taken to euthanasia and assisted suicide in a number of countries. To that end, I will first describe the way euthanasia and assisted suicide are currently handled in the legal system in Canada. I will then describe restorative justice and highlight some of the differences in both substance and process as between the traditional approach currently in use and the proposed restorative approach. I will follow this with an explanation of how a restorative justice approach could actually be implemented in this arena, flagging important challenges to doing so. In the end, I will conclude that taking a restorative justice approach to euthanasia and assisted suicide could enable movement in the seemingly intractable debate and the adoption of a more effective and compassionate response to extraordinarily difficult situations.
Ken Himma (Seattle Pacific University), "A defence of traditional conceptual analysis"
CAVE Seminar: 28 July 2011, in conjunction with the Julius Stone Institute (University of Sydney)
Ken Himma (Seattle Pacific University)
"A defence of traditional conceptual analysis"
Time: 4.30 - 6 pm
Venue: W3A, Blackshield Room
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University), "Do psychopaths make moral judgements?"
Joint CAVE/MACCS seminar: Tuesday 16 July 2011
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University)
"Do psychopaths make moral judgements?"
Time: 4.00pm - 5.30 pm
Venue: C5C 498
Psychopaths are less than 1% of the population but commit over 30% of the violent crime in most modern societies. Some experts claim that psychopaths make moral judgments but do not care about morality. Others argue that psychopaths do not really make moral judgments but only pretend to do so. I will present recent data as well as experimental plans to address this dispute. These results can be important for treatment, prediction, and punishment policies as well as philosophical debates about the nature and basis of moral judgment.
Jessica Wolfendale (West Virginia University), "The right not to be tortured"
CAVE seminar: Tuesday 7 June 2011
Jessica Wolfendale (West Virginia University)
"The right not to be tortured"
Time: 11.00am - 1.00pm
Venue: W6A 708
Jessica Wolfendale writes: Jeff McMahan has recently argued that the right not to be tortured can be forfeited in classic 'ticking bomb' scenarios. McMahan claims that the terrorist's responsibility for creating the threat of the ticking bomb makes him 'morally liable' to be tortured, and thus the terrorist has no right not to be tortured. This view of the right not to be tortured was adopted by the Bush Administration in the torture memos, and is shared by other philosophers, included David Rodin and Stephen Kershnar. In this paper I argue that the right not to be tortured is derived from the right to be treated as a person - a right that cannot be forfeited even in cases of extreme wrongdoing. I argue that the right to be treated as a person is grounded in the features of persons that enable them to be rational moral agents capable of maintaining a unified sense of agency. This right generates a correlative duty to refrain from actions that undermine or attack the capacities for personhood, of which torture is a paradigmatic example. The right to be treated as a person (and so the right not to be tortured) cannot be forfeited because there is a fundamental connection between personhood and moral accountability. Holding agents morally responsible requires seeing them as persons, as only persons may be held morally accountable for their actions. This requires that we continue to see them as persons, and as such they are entitled to the respect due to persons by virtue of their capacity for agency.
Karen Jones (University of Melbourne), "Epistemic Injustice and Self-Trust"
CAVE seminar: Friday 27May 2011
Karen Jones (University of Melbourne)
"Epistemic Injustice and Self-Trust"
Time: 1.30pm - 3.30pm
Venue: W6A 708
"In this paper", Karen Jones writes, "I sketch an account of intellectual self-trust, arguing that it has an important non-cognitive component and that it is created an sustained socially. Next, drawing on work in social psychology, I look at the ways in which social injustice creates epistemic injustice, which in turn undermines self-trust. Finally, drawing the empirical and philosophical threads together, I make some suggestions for remedy".
Past public lectures
Gillian Triggs (Australian Human Rights Commission), "The Business of Human Rights"
CAVE Public Lecture: Thursday 17 September 2015
Gillian Triggs (Australian Human Rights Commission)
"The Business of Human Rights"
Time: 17:30 - 19:00
Venue: Australian Hearing Hub Theatre 1
Prof. Triggs' profile can be found on our visitors page.
This lecture is available for viewing on Youtube.
Julian Savulescu (Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Oxford), "Enhancing Responsibility"
CAVE Public Lecture: Tuesday 9 December 2014
Julian Savulescu (Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Oxford)
Time: 17:30 - 19:00
Venue: E7B 100 Theatrette
What is moral responsibility? When is it appropriate to praise or blame someone for the consequences of their actions? How should we decide whether someone is morally responsible for some bad event? Responsibility is central our conceptions of ourselves as persons. People "take responsibility" for their actions. But what does this mean? Recent neuroscience and psychology are calling into question whether free will exists and whether people are "in control" of their actions. How should should we decide whether criminals are responsible, in light of recent neuroscientific research? Should people suffering from lifestyle diseases, such as alcoholism, smoking and obesity, be held responsible for their ill health and given lower priority in health delivery?
I will explore these questions and whether responsibility could be enhanced by biomedical means. I will argue that we both can and should enhance responsibility.
Prof. Savulescu's profile is available on our visitors page.
Bernadette McSherry (University of Melbourne), "Legal Capacity, Mental Capacity and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities"
CAVE Public Lecture: Wednesday 23 October 2013
Bernadette McSherry (University of Melbourne)
"Legal Capacity, Mental Capacity and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities"
Time: 5.30pm - 7.00pm
Venue: Hearing Hub Lecture Theatre 1
Professor McSherry is the Foundation Director of the Melbourne Social Equity Institute, University of Melbourne, and Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Law, Monash University. She is an Australian Research Council Federation Fellow. She has honours degrees in Arts and Law, Masters of Law from the University of Melbourne, a PhD from York University, Canada and a Graduate Diploma in Psychology from Monash University. She is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Social Sciences and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Law. Professor McSherry is a legal member of the Mental Health Review Board of Victoria and has acted as a consultant to government on criminal law, sentencing and mental health law issues.
Julian Burnside, AO QC, "Defining our National Character: Our Treatment of Asylum Seekers"
CAVE Public Lecture: Tuesday 2 October 2012
Mr Julian Burnside, AO QC
"Defining Our National Character: Our Treatment of Asylum Seekers"
Time: 6.00 pm
Venue: W5A T1
Julian Burnside is a barrister specialising in commercial litigation. He joined the Bar in 1976 and took silk in 1989. He acted for the Ok Tedi natives against BHP, for Alan Bond in fraud trials, for Rose Porteous in numerous actions against Gina Rinehart, and for the Maritime Union of Australia in the 1998 waterfront dispute against Patrick Stevedores. Julian was Senior Counsel assisting the Australian Broadcasting Authority in the "Cash for Comment" inquiry and was senior counsel for Liberty Victoria in the Tampa litigation.
He is a former President of Liberty Victoria, and has acted pro bono in many human rights cases, in particular concerning the treatment of refugees. In 2004 he was elected as a Living National Treasure. In 2009 he was made an Officer of the Order of Australia.
This lecture is available for listening on Youtube.
Thomas Pogge (Yale University), "Human rights as constraints on global institutional arrangements"
CAVE Public Lecture: Thursday 11 August 2011
Thomas Pogge (Yale University)
"Human rights as constraints on global institutional arrangements"
Venue: Y3A Theatre 1
Severe poverty and massive disease burdens are human rights violations when they are the foreseeable effect of active conduct by human agents and an effect these agents could avoid without undue hardship. By this criterion, the failure of rich countries and their corporations and citizens to assist very poor people abroad does not violate any human rights of the latter because the relevant conduct of the former is merely passive: they fail to help. Yet, the rich countries and their corporations and citizens are violating the human rights of the global poor if and insofar as they do things that, for the sake of minor gains, foreseeably aggravate severe poverty and disease. One thing they do together, and with the help of poor-country rulers and "elites," is design and impose supranational institutional arrangements that -- shaped to benefit the imposers -- are foreseeably much less avoiding of severe poverty and disease than they might be. This claim can be illustrated by reference to the regulation of trade (grandfathering of protectionist barriers), intellectual property, profit-and-loss reporting, banking deposits, environmental harms, labor standards, sovereign borrowing and resource exports, and international trade in arms. In view of the harms such supranational institutional arrangements foreseeably and avoidably inflict on the global poor, their imposition can easily qualify as the largest (though not the gravest) human rights violation in human history.
This lecture is available for listening on Youtube.
Cordelia Fine (University of Melbourne), "'The Female Brain is a High Performance Emotion Machine'!: Issues in the Interpretation and Reporting of Brain Science, from Scanner to Soundbite"
CAVE Public Lecture: 27 October 2009
Cordelia Fine (University of Melbourne)
'The female brain is a high performance emotion machine"! : Issues in the interpretation and reporting of brain science, from scanner to soundbite'
Lecture on the topic of Dr. Fine's recently published book: Delusions of Gender: How our minds, society and neurosexism create difference (New York: WW Norton, 2010).
Archival calendar of events
2-3 February: CAVE Workshop: Understanding Complex Animal Cognition
6 February: Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Kristin Andrews (York), "What does it mean to call a chimpanzee a person?"
15 May: CAVE Workshop: Predictive Coding, Delusions, and Agency
15 June: CAVE Workshop: Amnesia and Identity: self, memory, and moral psychology
5-9 July: AAP Conference: Australasian Association of Philosophy 2015 Conference
13 July: CAVE Workshop: Consciousness, Subjectivity, and Self
7 September: CAVE Seminar: Marc Lewis (Radboud), "Throwing out the brain with the bathwater? What neuroscience can teach us about recovery in addiction."
17 September: CAVE Public Lecture: Gillian Triggs, "Business and Human Rights."
13 October: Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Jennifer Radden (Massachusetts, Boston), "Folly, Melancholy, Madnesse are but one disease: Feelings and Reasoning Norms in the Anatomy of Melancholy and today's Mind Sciences."
15 - 16 October: CAVE Conference: Defining the Boundaries of Disease
20 October: Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Heidi Maibom (Cincinnati), "Reeenactment, counterfactual reasoning, and empathy."
3 November: Joint CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Luke Russell (Sydney), "Forgiving Under Ignorance."
4 - 5 November: CAVE Conference: Perspectives on Empathy
8 December: Launch: Australian Neurolaw Database
26 April: TEDx Talk by CAVE associate member, Dr. Nicole Vincent, " Enhancement: The New 'Normal'?"
2 May: CAVE Workshop: Neurolaw in Australia.
5 May: CAVE Reading Group on Fiery Cushman's work.
23 May: CAVE Seminar: Dr. Monique Crane (Macquarie University), "Moral Distress in the Workplace."
27 May: CAVE Reading Group on Emmanuel Renault's work.
29-30 May: Agency and Moral Cognition Network/CAVE Workshop.
10 June: CAVE Seminar: Prof. Emmanuel Renault (Paris, Nanterre), on "Social Self and Work in The Phenomenology of Spirit."
13 June: CAVE Seminar: Presentation by Prof. Emmanuel Renault (Paris, Nanterre), "Marx's Critique of the Market."
16 June: Joint CAVE/Centre for Legal Governance/Macquarie Law School Seminar: Prof. Kevin Toh (San Francisco State University), "The Place of Social Practices in our Normative Lives."
31 July: HDR session: Ethics in the Field with Prof. Robert Frodeman (University of North Texas)
1 August: Workshop: Ethics in the Field.
19 August: CAVE Workshop: Cultural Evolution.
26 August: CAVE Seminar: Prof. Andrew Moore (University of Otago), "Objective Wellbeing."
29 August: CAVE Seminar: Prof. Andrew Moore (University of Otago), "The job of 'ethics committees.'"
27 September: TEDx Talk by CAVE HDR student, Tereza Hendl, "Ethical aspects of gender selection for non-medical reasons." More info here.
24 October: CAVE/Philosophy Department Seminar: Heather Draper (Birmingham), "An empirically informed ethical framework for social care robots for older people."
31 October: CAVE Workshop: "Addressing challenges in consent to surgical innovations."
20-21 November: CAVE workshop: "Moral Responsibility: Non-Metaphysical Perspectives."
25 November: CAVE Masterclass with Marina Oshana (University of California, Davis).
28 November: CAVE workshop: "Predictive Coding, Delusions, and Agency." - POSTPONED TILL 2015
9 December: CAVE Public Lecture: Julian Savulescu (Oxford), "Enhancing Responsibility."
10 December: CAVE workshop: "Synthetic Biology."
16 December: HDR Session with Mary Rawlinson.
17 December: CAVE Seminar: Mary Rawlinson, "Eating at the Heart of Ethics."
18 December: CAVE workshop: "The problems with choosing children's gender."
19-20 February: CAVE Workshop: Working in Australia: Contemporary Trends, New Critical Perspectives
12 March: CAVE Seminar: Professor Arto Laitinen (University of Jyväskylä, Finland), "Declarations, Deontic Powers and Directions of Fit: On Searle's Social Ontology" AND "Problems and Promises in the Philosophy of Recognition."
11 April: CAVE Workshop: Competence in psychiatric settings
3 May: CAVE Seminar: Kathryn Millard (MMCS, Macquarie University), "Revisioning Obedience: Stanley Milgram's laboratory drama."
10-11 May: CAVE Workshop: Point of View in Memory and Imagery: philosophical and psychological perspectives on perspectives
26 June: CAVE Workshop: Bioethics Cluster Work-in-Progress Afternoon
4-5 July: CAVE Workshop: Vulnerable Animals
21 August: CAVE Workshop: Autonomy
25-26 September: Agency and Moral Cognition Network meeting
18 October: CAVE Workshop: Meaning in life (and why it matters)
23 October: CAVE Public Lecture: Professor Bernadette McSherry (University of Melbourne), "Legal Capacity, Mental Capacity and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities"
28 October: CAVE Workshop: Ethical Issues in Surgical Innovation
6 November: CAVE Workshop: Relational Autonomy and Bioethics
8 November: CAVE Workshop: Paternalism
20 November: Workshop: Judging Responsibility
21-22 November: Workshop: Dignity
6 November: Workshop: Evolution of Language
24-25 February: Workshop (organised jointly by CAVE and CCD): Philosophy of Psychiatry
17 April: Workshop: Apartheids of the Mind
3-4 May: Workshop: Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality
17 July: CAVE Research Afternoon
20-22 July: Conference: Australian Society of Legal Philosophy Conference (under the auspices of CAVE)
23 July: Workshop: Addiction Neuroscience: Interpretation and implications for public policy, legal practice, ethics, treatment, and user identity and belief in self-sufficiency
24 July: HDR Session with Professor Duff
25 July: Joint CAVE/CLG seminar: Professor Antony Duff (University of Stirling), "Crimes and Torts."
3 September: Joint CAVE/CLG seminar: Professor Heidi M. Hurd (University of Illinois) and Professor Ralph Brubaker (University of Illinois): "Debts and the Demands of Conscience: The Moral Underpinnings of Bankruptcy Law."
2 October: CAVE Public Lecture: Mr Julian Burnside, AO QC, "Defining Our National Character: Our Treatment of Asylum Seekers."
15 November: Workshop: Capabilities Approach to Justice: Theory and Practice
27 November: CAVE Seminar: Professor Vikki Entwistle (University of Dundee),"Doing Philosophy with Clinicians and Patients."
5 December: Workshop: Philosophy and Cognitive Science
6 December: CAVE Seminar: Shaun Gallagher (Memphis), Dan Hutto (Hertfordshire) and Somogy Varga (Memphis), "Social ontology, Critical Theory and Extended Minds."
7 December: CAVE seminar: Professor Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis), "Autonomy, Self-Agency and Social Interaction."
10 December: CAVE special seminar: Dr Robert McKay (Sheffield University), Dr Anat Pick (Queen Mary College, London) and Dr Tom Tyler (Oxford Brookes University),"Otherwise than Being Human: Three Talks on Non‐anthropocentric Collectivity and Ethical Agency."
10-11 December: Workshop: Skills and Expertise
24 March: Addiction and Moral Identity Advisory Group meeting
27 May: CAVE seminar: Karen Jones (University of Melbourne), "Epistemic injustice and self-trust."
7 June: CAVE Seminar: Jessica Wolfendale (West Virginia University), "The right not to be tortured."
10 June: CAVE Research Network Meeting
17 and 20-21 June: Workshop: Agent Tracking and Its Disorders: A Multidisciplinary Workshop on the Identification and Tracking of Human Individuals (co-sponsored with the Centre for Language Sciences and the Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science).
14-15 July: Workshop: Neurolaw in Australia - revealing the hidden impact of neuroscience and behavioural genetics on Australian law
16 July: Symposium: Neurolaw Symposium: "The Science of the Mind Meets the Body of the Law"
21 July: Workshop: Agency and Moral Cognition Network workshop: "Character, Capacity and Personality"
21 July: CAVE Launch
26 July: CAVE seminar: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University), "Do psychpaths make moral judgements?"
28 July: CAVE seminar: Ken Himma (Seattle Pacific University), "A defence of traditional conceptual analysis"
11 August: CAVE Public Lecture: Thomas Pogge (Yale University) "Human rights as constraints on global institutional arrangements."
20-21 September: Symposium: Testing Times: A symposium on the ethics and epistemology of animal experimentation
30 September: CAVE seminar: Jocelyn Downie (Dalhousie University): "End of Life Law and Policy: A New Arena for Restorative Justice"
10-11 November: Conference: Work and Self-Development: an interdisciplinary conference
24 November: CAVE seminar: Beate Roessler (University of Amsterdam), "Authenticity of Cultures and Persons."