Department of Philosophy

Neil Levy

BA(Hons) Monash, PhD Monash, PhD MonashNeil Levy

Neil received a PhD in Continental Philosophy in 1995 and a second PhD, this time in analytic philosophy, in 2006. He was a Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, from 2002 to 2009. In 2010 he moved to the Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, where he was Head of Neuroethics and an ARC Future Fellow. From 2006 onwards, he has held appointments at the University of Oxford, where he is currently Leverhulme Visiting Professor. From 2016, he will be half time at Oxford and half time at Macquarie.

Current Research

Neil's research is focused on a number of questions concerning how the cognitive sciences can illuminate traditional philosophical debates. He is especially interested in the extent to which ascriptions of moral responsibility continue to be justified in the light of findings in neuroscience and social psychology on action control, and in how nonconscious representations affect action. He also works on free will and moral responsibility more broadly, on applied ethics and the philosophy of psychology.

Selected Publications

  • Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.
  • Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
  • Neuroethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
  • What Makes us Moral? Crossing the Boundaries of Biology, Oneworld, Oxford, 2004.
  • Moral Relativism: An Introduction, Oneworld, Oxford, 2002.
  • Sartre, Oneworld, Oxford, 2002.
  • Being Up-To-Date: Foucault, Sartre and Postmodernity, Peter Lang, New York, 2001.
Edited Collections
  • Meghan Griffiths, Neil Levy and Kevin Timpe, (eds). The Routledge Companion to Free Will, forthcoming.
  • Jens Clausen and Neil Levy. (eds). Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer, 2014.
  • Neil Levy (ed). Self-Control and Addiction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Book Chapters
  • Naturalism and Free Will. In Kelly James Clark (ed). Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, forthcoming.
  • Vegetarianism: Towards Ideological Impurity. In Ben Bramble and Bob Fischer (eds). The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat, Oxford University Press, 2015.
  • (with Eric Mandelbaum). The Powers that Bind: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Obligation. In Jon Matheson and Rico Vitz (eds). The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Consciousness Matters. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed). Moral Psychology: Vol. 4, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2014.
  • Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy - Comfortable Bedfellows. In Matthew Haug (ed). Philosophical Methods, Routledge, 2014.
  • Punishing the Addict: Reflections on Gene Heyman. In Thomas Nadelhoffer (ed). The Future of Punishment. Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Moral responsibility and consciousness: two challenges, one solution. In Nicole Vincent (ed). Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Addiction, Responsibility and Ego-Depletion. In J. Poland and G. Graham (eds) Addiction and Responsibility. MIT Press, 2011.
  • (with Jonathan McGuire). Cognitive Enhancement and Intuitive Dualism. In Robyn Langdon and Catriona Mackenzie (eds), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. New York: Psychology Press, 2011.
  • Luck and Free Will. In J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff and K. Frankish (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-MacMillan, 2011.
  • Neuroethics and the Extended Mind. In J. Illes and B. Sahakian (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press, 2011.
  • Psychopathy, Responsibility and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. In L. Malatesti and J. McMillan (eds) Responsibility and Psychopathy. Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Addiction and Compulsion. In T. O'Connor and C. Sandis (eds) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Blackwell, 2010.
  • Self-Deception without Thought Experiments. In J. Fernandez and T. Bayne (eds) Delusions, Self-Deception and Affective Influences on Belief-formation. New York: Psychology Press, 2009.
  • (with Tim Bayne) The Feeling of Doing. In Sebanz, N. & Prinz, W. Disorders of Volition. MIT Press, 2006.
  • Foucault's Unnatural Ecology. In Éric Darier (ed), Discourses of the Environment, Basil Blackwell, 1999.
Selected Journal Articles
  • Obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disorder of attention. Mind & Language, forthcoming.
  • Religious beliefs are factual beliefs: Content does not correlate with context sensitivity. Cognition, forthcoming.
  •  Am I A Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism. Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.
  • Embodied Savoir-Faire: Knowledge-How Requires Motor Representations. Synthese, 194 (2017), 511-530.
    Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94 (2017), 3-26.
  • The Sweetness of Surrender: Glucose enhances self-control by signalling environmental richness. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (2016), 813-825
  • 'My name is Joe and I'm an alcoholic': Addiction, Self-knowledge and the Dangers of Rationalism. Mind & Language, 31 (2016), 265-276.
  • Have I Turned the Stove Off? Explaining Everyday Anxiety. Philosopher's Imprint, 16 (2016), 1-10.

Recent Research Grants

  • Research Fellowship: Self-Control and Pathologies of Agency (ARC Future Fellowship; 2010-2014)
  • Chief Investigator (with Dr Daniel Cohen): Challenges to Moral Responsibility (ARC Discovery Grant; 2011-2013)
  • Chief Investigator (with Dr Rob Hester): Enhancing Free Will: Implications for Moral Responsibility (Templeton Foundation Project Grant; 2011-2012)
  • Partner Investigator (with Professor Julian Savulescu): Oxford Centre for Neuroethics (Wellcome Trust Grant; 2008-2012)

Contact Details

Location: Building W6A Room 731
Phone: (61 2) 9850 6800
Fax: (61 2) 9850 8892
Office hours: to be advised